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I. INTRODUCTION

A religious organization enters a contract with a builder to
construct a new facility and breaches the contract; a student at a
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private, religiously-affiliated school slips on a patch of ice and is
seriously injured because of the school maintenance crew's negligence. The builder and the student are aggrieved by the actions of
the respective religious institutions. Consequently, they seek to resolve their disputes through the judicial system, as would any other
individual with a potential legal claim. Although the adjudicative
process would involve church and state, the First Amendment Religion Clauses would not likely be implicated, because the application of contract and tort law to these secular activities does not inhibit religious exercise or involve government in religious activities.
In contrast to the above contract and tort examples, consider
the relationship between church and state that would ensue from
adjudicating a tort claim filed by a parishioner whose priest's marriage counseling progressed to sexual misconduct, 1 or an employment discrimination claim by a female nun who was allegedly de2
nied tenure as a professor of canonical law because of her gender.
These legal disputes do not involve mere application of a secular
standard to secular conduct. 3 Rather, adjudicating claims that implicate matters of church doctrine or governance necessitates a certain degree of intrusion into constitutionally significant religious
matters.
As long as church and state have coexisted, courts have
struggled with the question of how to treat disputes involving religious institutions. On the one hand, religious institutions are like
corporations and other organizations in that they are comprised of
individuals but act as unified entities. Clearly, the state regulates
corporations and non-religious organizations, so by analogy, religious institutions should not be immune from state regulation. 4 On
the other hand, the Framers of the Constitution distinguished religion from other group activities by affording religious groups special protections from state interference in the First Amendment's
1.

See Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming the dismissal

of a female plaintiffs claim against her church for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision

because examining the church's decisions to hire, terminate, or retain clergy would necessarily
entangle the court in issues of religious law, practices, and policies), reuiew granted,735 So. 2d
1284 (Fla. 1999).

2. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that
the application of Title VII to a nun's sex discrimination claim would impermissibly entangle
church and state under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses).
3. See, eg., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (CApplication of a secular standard to secular conduct that is tortious is not prohibited by the Constitution.').
4. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir.
1985) ("Of course churches are not-and should not be-above the law. Like any other person or
organization, they may be held liable for their torts and upon their valid contracts.").
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Religion Clauses. 5 This protection from state regulation is not without limit, however, especially when religious organizations' interests collide with those of individuals whom the state has a regulatory interest in protecting. Considering this conflict of interests,
how courts should respond when individuals assert that a religious
institution has violated their legal rights is a complicated issue,
especially in the context of an increasing amount of state regulation.
The issue varies in complexity, however, depending on the
type of legal dispute at hand. Intuitively, certain bodies of law are
less controversial than others in their application to religious institutions. For example, application of contract law to a breach of contract issue or tort law to a negligence claim does not raise substantial issues of state intrusion into important church matters. 6 When
the applicable body of law intrudes more extensively into religious
governance or doctrine, however, courts struggle to determine the
extent to which churches should comply. One such troublesome
area of law is employment discrimination. This Note seeks to define
the proper role of courts in mediating discrimination-based employment disputes involving religious institutions.7 Specifically,
this Note argues that instead of focusing on whether an employment dispute implicates a ministerial relationship, 8 as courts have
done by analyzing the primary duties of the plaintiff in order to determine application of the constitutional ministerial exception, jus-

5.
U.S. CONST. amend. I C'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...").

6.

See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and EcclesiasticalOfficers: The

FirstAmendment Considerations,89 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 76 (1986). One commentator argues that

the judicial bar on adjudicating certain tort claims against churches, which most frequently
applies to cases involving clergy misconduct toward congregants or children and is intended
primarily to restrain courts from adjudicating religious questions, is likely to be deconstructed
over time do to the influence of cultural, institutional, doctrinal, and theoretical factors. Scott C.
Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of ConstitutionalProtection, 75 IND.

L.J. 219, 240-59 (2000) (arguing that cultural, institutional, doctrinal, and theoretical factors
"point towards the eventual erosion or abrogation of the constitutional prohibition on subjecting

religious entities to standard forms of tort adjudication").
7.

This Note will primarily focus on federal statutory employment discrimination claims

but will also address various state law claims that are similar to employment discrimination
claims in terms of the extent to which church/minister relationships are implicated by adjudica.
tion. See infra Part V.A (analogizing federal hostile environment sexual harassment claims to

state law negligent hiring and supervision claims on the basis of their proclivity to raise Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause issues when asserted against religious institutions).

8. This Note uses the term "ministerial relationship," to describe the employment relation.
ship between a church and its minister. See infra Part IV for a more detailed definition of a

"minister."
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ticiability should be based on whether adjudication of the dispute
would actually implicate religious doctrine or practice.
Part II of this Note examines the statutory framework of Title VII and the extent to which Title VII's language facially applies
to employment disputes involving religious employers. Part III of
this Note lays out the constitutional arguments for excluding religious institutions from compliance with federal employment discrimination laws and discusses the development of a constitutionally-based ministerial exception to the application of Title VII and
other federal employment discrimination laws. Part IV of this Note
evaluates the "primary duties of the plaintiff' analysis employed by
courts to determine whether the ministerial exception should apply
to particular employment discrimination claims against religious
employers. Part V of this Note examines the ministerial exception
in the context of sexual harassment and negligent hiring and supervision claims involving harm to third parties outside the ambit
of the church/minister relationship, in which courts have diverged
from the traditional ministerial exception analysis and refused to
grant immunity to church employment decisions absent a religious
belief or practice implicated by adjudication.
Finally, Part VI of this Note argues that the standard for determining whether a court should adjudicate a particular employment discrimination case involving a religious organization should
focus on whether the court would have to examine religious doctrine or practice in order to resolve the particular claim. 9 Such a
standard is necessary in order to ensure that the constitutional
ministerial exception only applies if the defendant has a legitimate
First Amendment interest in an exemption from the requirements
of Title VII. If no question of religious doctrine or practice is implicated by adjudication of the plaintiffs employment discrimination
claim, the defendant fails to satisfy the basic Free Exercise Clause
requirement of a significant burden on religious exercise.10 In addition, a religious institution cannot plausibly argue that the Establishment Clause is violated when a court adjudicates a dispute in-

9. Essentially, the model that this Note proposes would examine whether a question of religious doctrine or practice would be implicated by the plaintiffs claim, rather than whether the
plaintiffs job duties are sufficiently ecclesiastical to classify the position as ministerial-the
focus of the current ministerial exception test. See infra Parts IV.A, VI.B.
10. See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 (1989) C'It is virtually self-evident
that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a governmental program
unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens the claimant's freedom to exercise religious rights." (quoting Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303

(1985))).
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volving purely secular conduct and mbtivation, because the state
would not be entangling itself in religious matters. Given that the
ministerial exception is doctrinally based in the First Amendment's
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, this Note's proposal to
require the implication of religious conduct or practice for the ministerial exception's application results in a test more closely aligned
with the exception's underlying purpose.
II. STATUTORY EXEMPTION OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
UNDER TITLE VII
When an employee brings a Title VII employment discrimination claim against a religious organization, the organization has
two defenses it may assert to preclude application of Title VII to its
employment decision. First, if the claim stems from an allegation
that the organization discriminated against employees based on
religion, the organization may invoke the protection of the Title VII
statutory religious exemption.' Alternatively, if the plaintiffs current or desired employment position involves primarily religious
functions, a church defendant may assert the constitutional ministerial exception as a defense to application of Title VII. 12 Thus,
when a church employee brings a Title VII claim against her employer, a religious organization has two possible lines of defense to
prevent a court from adjudicating the dispute: one statutory, based
on the type of discrimination at issue, and the other constitutional,
based on the primary employment duties of the plaintiff.
A. The Title VII Religious Institution Exemption Pre- and PostAmendment
When Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the statute's terms did not apply equally to all employers and
employment activities. Rather, section 702 of Title VII provided,
This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens
outside any State, or to a religious corporation,association, or society with respect
to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work con-

nected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, or society of its religious activities or to an educational institution with respect to the employment of

individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such insti3

tution.1

11.
12.
13.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part III.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (emphasis added).
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As enacted, Title VII exempted religious institutions only to
the extent they discriminated against employees involved in strictly
14
religious activities.

Eight years after enacting Title VII, however, Congress expanded the scope of the religious institution exemption to include

all activities of religious institutions, instead of merely their religious activities.' 5 By amending the statute to include religious institutions' "activities," rather than merely their "religious activities,"
Congress brought the full range of a religious institution!s employment activities within the ambit of the religious institution exemp-

tion. 16 Because Congress did not limit the scope of the amendment's
application, exempted "activities" could arguably extend to any forprofit endeavors pursued by a religious institution. 17 In extending

14. Id.
15. Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 702, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1994)) (stating that Title VII shall not apply to a religious institution
"with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its
activities") (emphasis added). This amendment originated from concerns that private religiouslyaffiliated educational institutions were unable to apply religious criteria in hiring educators,
because education was not considered a religious activity under the Title VII exemption. See 118
CONG. REC. 946 (1972) (statement of Sen. Allen), reprinted in SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR,
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOY)MET OPPORTUNITYACT OF 1972, at 844 (1972). In debating the proposed deletion of the
religious activity requirement from the exemption, one of the amendmenge sponsors expressed
fears that Title VII could force a religious school to hire atheists if the class subject matter was
not theology or a religiously-based topic. Id.
16. See 118 CONG. REC. 4503 (1972) (statement of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in SENATE
SUBCOML ON LABOR, CONM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 1645 (1972). The amendment'a sponsors argued that extending the exemption to non-religious activities would remedy this problem,
because it would "take the political hands of Caesar off of the institutions of God, where they
have no place to be." Id.
17. For a discussion of the potential Establishment Clause violations arising from exempting religious organizations from government regulation, see King's Garden,Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d
51, 54 (D.C.Cir. 1974) CIf a religious sect should own and operate a trucking firm, a chain of
motels, a race track, a telephone company, a railroad, a fried chicken franchise, or a professional
football team, the enterprise could limit employment to members of the sect without infringing
the Civil Rights Act."); William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. LJ.293, 324-26 (1986) ('Freeing religious organizations from regulation provides a relative benefit for religion over nonreligion,
which may raise establishment concerns."). One commentator characterizes the problem arising
from government regulation of the employment relationship between churches and their employees as a "three-way web of tensions." Scott D. McClure, Note, Religious Preferences in Employment Decisions:How FarMay Religious OrganizationsGo?, 1990 DUE LJ.587, 591 (asserting
that "[g]overnment creates a three-way web of tensions when it attempts to legislate in areas
that concern employment in religious organizations" because (1) the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from requiring individuals to forgo practicing their religious beliefs in order to
procure and maintain employment, (2) First Amendment principles dictate that government
should not intrude upon a religious institution's selection of employees to carry out its spiritual
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the exception's application to non-religious activities, however,
Congress also opened the door to constitutional challenges based on
the amendment's seemingly preferential treatment of religious institutions conducting non-religious activities.
B. ConstitutionalAttacks on the 1972 Amendment to the Religious
Institution Exemption: The Free Exercise v. Establishment Clause
Debate
The amended statutory exemption treated religious and nonreligious institutions differently with respect to non-religious activities by exempting religious institutions to the exclusion of nonreligious organizations. As a result, courts faced numerous Establishment Clause challenges to the exception's constitutionality.18
Such challenges arose when secular church employees alleged that
the exception unconstitutionally favored religious organizations by
allowing religious employers to avoid application of Title VII, while
similarly situated non-religious employers remained open to liability. 19 Since the Establishment Clause prohibits state regulation
that inhibits or advances religion,2 0 various lower courts reasoned
that exempting the non-religious activities of religious organizations would result in an Establishment Clause violation. Consequently, these courts hesitated to construe the amendment as a
limitless expansion of the scope of religious organizations' protected
activities. 21 The following Sections outline the constitutional issues
raised by Congress's exemption of religious institutions from liability for certain forms of otherwise prohibited employment discrimination, and explain how courts resolved the tension between the
two Religion Clauses in the context of Title VII's application to religious institutions. 22

mission, and (3) the Establishment Clause prohibits laws that will result in the establishment of
religion).
18. See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987) (addressing the application of the statutory religious institution exemption to a building engineer for a church gymnasium); Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 977-79 (D. Mass. 1983) (addressing a journalism student's Title VII employment discrimination case against the ChristianScience Monitor for its application of a religious affiliation test to candidates for reporter positions).
19. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-40; Feldstein, 555 F. Supp. at 977-79.
20. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (asserting that, to pass muster under the
Establishment Clause, a law must not have a primary effect that inhibits or advances religion).
21. E.g., King's Garden,498 F.2d at 53-57.
22. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 13-18 (1947), for one of the Supreme
Court's first statements regarding the apparent tension between the Establishment Clause's
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1. Constitutional Issues Raised by Governmental Accommodation
of Religion
When government exempts a religious institution from a
law, regulation, or other burden otherwise imposed on the institution's exercise of religion, the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses define the limitations and requirements for such accommodation. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,2 government could

not burden a religious institution's free exercise of religion unless it
was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.A The Supreme

Court's decision in Smith, however, severely restricted courts' ability to grant relief to religious institutions on Free Exercise grounds
insofar as such institutions are merely being forced to comply with
neutral laws of general applicability, such as Title VII.Y Although
exemption from a neutral law of general applicability may not be
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause after Smith, courts and legislatures are free to accommodate religious exercise through legis-

lative exemptions, provided that the provision does not run afoul of
the Establishment Clause. 26 Section 702 of Title VII is an example
of such a permissive accommodation.

restrictions on governmental support of religion and the Free Exercise Clauses mandate against
governmental interference with religious exercise.
23. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
24. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963) (holding that, in order to justify a direct or indirect burden on religious exercise, government needs a compelling state interest).
25. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82 (holding that no Free Exercise problem results when a neutral, generally applicable law incidentally infringes on religious institutions' free exercise of
religion).
26. The Supreme Court has consistently found that a sphere of constitutionally permissible
"accommodation" of religion exists, despite the absence of a Free Exercise mandate for a religious
exemption. Congress, acting within the confines of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-20 (1997) (defining Congress's power to
accommodate religious exercise under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as an enforcement power that is limited to Congressional action reflecting a "congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end"), may accommodate religion and religious exercise so long as such accommodation does not result in an
unconstitutional establishment of religion, see, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987) ('This Court has long recognized that the government may (and
sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the
Establishment Clause."). The limits on such permissive accommodation are the Fourteenth
Amendment, which requires that legislative accommodation of religious exercise does not exceed
the extent of the injury to churches' exercise of religion, and the Establishment Clause, which
requires that legislative and judicial accommodation do not result in an establishment of religion. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (confining Congress's power to accommodate religious
exercise under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enacting remedial legislation that is in
proportion to the injury to be remedied-in this case, the burden on religious institutions' exer-

490
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Such accommodation differs from pre-Smith Free Exercise
exemptions because, unlike a finding that the Free Exercise Clause
requires protection, permissive accommodation is a discretionary
act, limited only by the Establishment Clause's negative mandate
27
that government refrain from establishing religion.
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from establishing religion, which includes "not only the institution of an official church, but any government act favoring religion, a particular
religion, or for that matter irreligion. ' 28 The purposes of the Establishment Clause include "guarantee[ing] the right of individual conscience against compulsion ... protect[ing] the integrity of religion
against the corrosion of secular support, and . . . preserv[ing] the

unity of political society against the antagonism of controversy over
public support for religious causes." 29 For several years, the Supreme Court consistently applied a three-prong test drawn from
Lemon v. Kurtzman to Establishment Clause claims. This test requires that governmental action have a secular purpose, that its
primary effect neither advance nor inhibit religion, and that the
action not result in the excessive entanglement of church and
state.30
Unlike the Free Exercise Clause, where the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence has focused on a test that is unitary, even if not entirely consistent, the Court's most recent Establishment Clause
cases indicate the Court's refusal to cabin itself to one particular
test for all Establishment Clause cases.

31

Rather, the Supreme

Court has applied different tests depending on the factual context
and the issues involved in the case at hand. The Establishment
Clause test applied by the Supreme Court has differed depending
on factors such as whether the case involved aid to religion 2 or the
cise of religion); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8-17 (1989) (holding that although

religious institutions are allowed to receive some benefits from governmental programs, such
programs must not violate the Establishment Clause).
27. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987); Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 144-45.
28. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2572 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
31. See, e.g., Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2573 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that "[i]n all the
years of its effort [in designing an Establishment Clause test], the Court has isolated no single
test of constitutional sufficiency").
32. See, e.g., id. at 2540-41 (applying the plurality's modified Lemon test, which considered
the entanglement inquiry to be part of the effect prong and distilled the ultimate inquiry down to
whether any religious indoctrination that might occur from the aid could reasonably be attributed to governmental action); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (holding that the appropriate test to
evaluate the constitutionality of government aid to religion required that the aid have a secular
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appearance of aid to religion,3 3 or whether the case involved students in a school setting.34 The Lemon test continues to provide an
important point of reference in assessing the Establishment Clause
issues raised by exempting religious institutions from Title VII,
however, given that (1) the Supreme Court has never overruled
Lemon, and (2) the cases discussing the constitutionality of both the
statutory Title VII exemption and the constitutionally based ministerial exception apply the Lemon test. Thus, while it is unclear
whether the Supreme Court would only apply the Lemon test to assess the constitutionality of exempting religious institutions from
Title VII if it were presented with the issue today, the Court's application of the test under similar circumstances in the past indicates that the test remains an important piece of the Establishment
Clause analysis.
2. Assessing the Constitutionality of the Statutory Religious
Institution Exemption: King's Garden,Inc. v. FCC and
Corporationof the PresidingBishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos
Shortly after Congress enacted Section 702 of Title VII, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in King's Garden, Inc. u.
FCC addressed the primary Establishment Clause arguments
against the constitutionality of the statute's new exemption of a
religious institution's non-religious activities. 35 In King's Garden, a
religious organization sought review of a Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") order finding that the organization's radio stations discriminated on the basis of religion in their employment
practices. 36 In its defense, the religious organization argued that

purpose, that it did not primarily advance or inhibit religion, and that it not excessively entangle
church and state).

33. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) (applying the "endorsement test," which prohibits the appearance of governmental advancement or support of
religion).
34. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2279-81 (2000)

(holding that a showing that a governmental practice resulting in the coercion of students to
participate in a religious activity was sufficient to prove an Establishment Clause violation); Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-99 (1992) (applying a coercion analysis to find that school prayer
by a rabbi at a high school graduation violated the Establishment Clause).
35. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 53-57 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The plaintiffs claim of

religious discrimination was based on the King's Garden radio station employment application,
which asked questions such as "Are you a Christian?" and "Is your spouse a Christian?" Id. at 52
n.1 (quoting the radio station's employment application).

36. Id. at 52. The FCC order also required the station to submit a statement regarding its
future hiring practices and policies. Id.
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Section 702 precluded application of Title VII to the radio station's
religious discrimination in its employment practices. 37 In response,
the FCC claimed that the Title VII exemption applied only to applicants for positions "connected with the espousal of the licensee's
religious views." 38 Ultimately, the court accepted the FCC's position
and held the FCC's qualified exemption for religious organizations
involved in broadcasting complied with the text of Title VII and did
not violate the organizations' rights under the Free Exercise
9
Clause.3
In assessing the FCC regulation's validity, the King's Garden
court first expressed doubt that Congress truly intended to exempt
both secular and non-secular activities of religious organizations
when it substituted "activities" for "religious activities." 40 By focusing on comments made by the amendment's sponsors during debate, the court constructed an argument that Congress primarily
intended the amendment to extend Title VII's exception to the hiring of educators by religiously affiliated schools, despite the absence
of such a limitation within the text of the amendment. 41 Absent a
nexus with religious doctrine, the court asserted, the religiouslyaffiliated broadcaster's Free Exercise rights were not implicated. 4
Rather, Congress's failure to delineate specifically excepted activi-

37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1994); King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 52-53.
38. King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 53. The court declined to address the applicability of the
FCC standard to any particular job position; rather, it assessed the facial conformity of the FCC
regulation to Title VII and the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 53-54, 59.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 53-55. In determining that Congress's purpose in enacting the amendment was
not to exempt every church-sponsored activity, the court looked to the legislative history of the
amendment and ascertained that Congress's primary goal in enacting the amendment was to
allow religious educational institutions to hire only individuals of a particular faith as educators.
Id. at 54 & n.6. Although the language of the amendment connotes application to any activity,
the court emphasized that Senators Allen and Ervin, the amendment's sponsors, always referred
to religiously affiliated schools in illustrating the effect of the proposed amendment. Id. at 54
n.6.

41. Id. at 54 & n.6. Additionally, the court noted that Congress indicated no intent for the
FCC to be bound by the exemption. Id. at 53. The court added that in the absence of a clear
intent for Title VII's religious organization exemption to apply to the FCC, the Commission's
"public interest' mandate should not be subsumed by the exemption. Id. at 53-54.
42. Id. at 60-61. The court, however, did not specifically state how the FCC could constitutionally or logistically ascertain whether an employment position or broadcast is sufficiently
religious in character to fall within the exception. Rather, the court indicated its confidence that
the FCC, like other public bodies dealing with religious organizations, had the capacity to dotermine First Amendment issues arising in communications licensing. Id. at 61. Although it would
be difficult to argue the FCC is not institutionally capable of assessing First Amendment free
speech issues, the court seemed to assume too much in determining that the FCC similarly
would be equipped to assess whether a program or employment position is sufficiently religious
as to implicate Free Exercise concerns and invoke the FCC qualified exemption.
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ties caused the amendment to be "of very doubtful constitutionality"
because of the Establishment Clause's requirement of governmental
neutrality toward religion. 43 In essence, the King's Garden court
reasoned that by opening up a religious organization's exempted
activities without limit, Congress crossed a fine line between accommodating religion and impermissibly creating a preference for
religious organizations in violation of the Establishment Clause. 44
Given this apparent tension between the plain statutory language
applying the exemption to all activities of religious organizations
and lower courts' doubts regarding the amendment's constitutionality, 45 this issue ultimately came up for review by the Supreme
Court.4

After various lower federal courts held that the statutory religious exemption's application to all activities of religious organi-

43. Id. at 53; see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839
(1995) CA central lesson of our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding governmental
programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their nedtrality towards religion.").
Applying the first prong of the test, the King's Garden court concluded that there was no conceivable secular purpose in exempting all activities of religious institutions. King's Garden, 498

F.2d at 55. Moreover, such an exemption would necessarily give religious organizations an unfair advantage over similarly situated non-religious employers in hiring employees for nonreligious activities, thereby violating the second prong of the Lemon test. Id.
44. Id. at 55 ("In creating this gross distinction between the rules facing religious and nonreligious entrepreneurs, Congress placed itself on collision course with the Establishment
Clause."); see also Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985) (characterizing the juxtaposition of

the First Amendmenes Religion Clauses as dual means provided by the Framers for freedom of
conscience with respect to religious rights in which, Wgust as the right to speak and the right to
refrain from speaking are complementary components of a broader concept of individual freedom
of mind, so also the individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to
refrain from accepting the creed established by the majority").
45. King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 53; see also Feldstein v. Christian ScL Monitor, 555 F. Supp.
974, 978 (D.Mass. 1983). In Feldstein, the United States District Court for the District of Mapsachusetts held that the Christian Science Monitor was statutorily exempt from compliance with
Title Viis prohibition of religious discrimination. Feldstein, 555 F. Supp. at 979. Instead of
applying the applicable amended version of the Title VII exemption, however, the court reasoned
that the Christian Science Monitor's hiring practices were exempt because the operation of the
Monitor was a religious activity of a religious organization. Id. Thus, the court found that the
Monitor met the stricter requirements of the statutory religious organization exemption as originally enacted. Id. In framing the issue and determining the standard for exemption under Title
VII, the Feldstein court similarly avoided applying the amended version of the religious organization exemption by holding the exemption of all activities of religious organizations to constitute a "preference" for religion under the Establishment Clause. Id. ('It is well established that
the expression of a preference for all religions is as constitutionally infirm as a preference for, or
a discrimination against, a particular religion." (citing Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973))). Thus, similar to the King's Garden court, the Feldstein court refused to apply the 1972 amendment to the Title VII religious organization exception
as written. Id.
46. See infra Part II.C. Instead of addressing the issue in King's Garden, the Supreme
Court resolved it by granting certiorari in the Amos case.
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zations violated the Establishment Clause,47 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the amended exception's constitutionality in
Corporationof the PresidingBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints v. Amos. 48 In Amos, an assistant building engineer filed suit on behalf of a purported class of plaintiffs who lost
their jobs with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the
Church) for their failure to obtain certificates showing they were
members of the Church and eligible to attend its temples. 49 The
plaintiffs subsequently filed suit, alleging that the church discriminated against them in violation of Title VII's prohibition against
religious discrimination and that if Section 702 applied, it would
violate the Establishment Clause. 50
To determine whether Title VII's amended exemption of religious organizations' religious and non-religious activities unconstitutionally aided religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause, the Amos Court analyzed the exemption using the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman.5 1 Applying Lemon's first prong, 52 the Court concluded that the amended
exception had a legitimate secular purpose in "alleviat[ing] significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organi-

47. See, e.g., King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 53-55; Feldstein, 555 F. Supp. at 978 (expressing
"grave doubts as to [the exemption's] ability to pass constitutional muster under the Establish.
ment Clause").
48. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987).
49. Id. at 330. The certificate at issue in Amos was a "temple recommend" and was only
granted to individuals who follow the church's standards in matters including "regular church
attendance, tithing, and abstinence from coffee, tea, alcohol, and tobacco." Id. at 330 n.4.
50. Id. at 331. At the trial level, the United States District Court for the District of Utah
held that the amended Title VII exception was unconstitutional for its failure to meet Lemon's
requirement that the exception have a primary purpose that neither inhibits nor advances religion. Id. at 332-33 (citing Amos v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791, 814-20 (D. Utah 1984)). The trial court held that the exemption's
application to secular activity violated the Establishment Clause by granting religious organizations "an exclusive authorization to engage in conduct which can directly and immediately advance religious tenets and practices." Id. at 333 (quoting Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 825). Refusing
to apply the exemption as amended, the trial court instead applied the 1964 version of the Title
VII religious organization exception. Id. (citing Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 799). Because the operation of the gymnasium for which the plaintiff worked was not a religious activity and his job did
not involve religious beliefs or rituals, the court held that the Church's religious discrimination
against the plaintiffs was not included within the original Title VII religious institution exemption. Id. at 331-32 (citing Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 802).
51. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
52. Id. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13) (stating that the first prong of the Establishment
Clause test is whether the law has a secular purpose).
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zations to carry out their religious missions." 3 The amendment actually decreased Establishment Clause concerns under the second
prong, the Amos Court asserted, because it relieved religious institutions of the burden of questioning whether particular activities
would be sufficiently "religious" to qualify under the exemption.54 In
holding that the amended exemption satisfied Lemon's second
prong, the Court distinguished between the impermissible effect of
government advancing (or inhibiting) religion and the permissible
effect of allowing for religious organizations to advance religion. 55
Because the amended Title VII exemption merely enabled religious

organizationsto advance religion, in a manner similar to granting
tax exemptions to churches, 56 the Amos Court held that Section

702's primary effect was not to foster governmental advancement of

53. Id. The Amos Court emphasized that the first prong of the Lemon test is intended to
prevent the relevant governmental decision maker from acting with the intent to promote a
certain point ofview in religious matters. Id.
54. Id. Even when federal courts attempted to ascertain whether a religious organization's
activity was religious for purposes of the Title VII exception, the courts recognized the difficulty
of accurately determining the distinction. In Feldstein v. ChristianScience Monitor, the court
noted comments by Senator Ervin, a sponsor of the amendment, indicating his concerns with the
government's incapacity to distinguish non-religious from religious activities. Feldstein v. Christian Sci Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D. Mass. 1983). Senator Ervin argued, "[ut is impossible to separate the religious and non-religious activities of a religious... educational institution
or religious society from its other activities." Id. (citing SENATE SUBCOMlL ON LABOR, C01.. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISrORY OF THE EQUAL EAPLOYMENt
OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 1212, 1223 (1972)). Despite these comments from the amendments sponsors, courts continued to determine eligibility for the Title VII exemption based on
whether the activity was sufficiently religious. This analysis tended to turn on whether a religious organization pursued the activity in order to promote religion and whether the religious
organization exerted sufficient control over the daily operations of the activity at issue. Id. at
977-78.
55. Amos, 327 U.S. at 336-37. The Court emphasized, "[a] law is not unconstitutional simply
because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have
forbidden 'effects' under Lemon... government itself [must have] advanced religion through its
own activities and influence." Id. at 337. As the Supreme Court has indicated through its application of the endorsement test in cases such as County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court is not
simply concerned with actual advancement of religion, but also the appearancethat government
is in some way advancing religion. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989).
In order for an Establishment Clause violation to arise, however, the government must have
created the impermissible inference of governmental advancement of religion. Amos, 483 U.S. at
336-37. As an example of the distinction between governmental and private advancement of
religion, the Amos Court cited Waiz v. Tax Commission, in which the Supreme Court held that
property tax exemptions for religious organizations had a principal effect that did not advance
religion, though clearly such exemptions enabled religious organizations themselves to more
effectively advance religion by freeing them of a burden carried by non-religious organizations.
Id. (quoting Wal v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). The Walz Court drew from the
Framers' intent that "establishment" of religion "connoted sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Walz, 397 U.S. at 668, quoted in Amos,
483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 668.
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religion.5 7 Finally, the Court determined that the amended statutory exemption easily satisfied Lemon's third prong, which prohibits
excessive entanglement of church and state. 58 The Court found that
the amended exemption prevented government from engaging in an
"intrusive inquiry" into whether a religious organization's activity
was sufficiently "religious" to qualify under the exemption. 59 Because the Amos Court found the amended exemption for religious
institutions satisfied all three prongs of the Lemon test,60 it held
that the exemption's application did not violate the Establishment
Clause and was therefore constitutional. 61 Thus, Amos clearly established a religious organization's right to discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring employees for any type of activity sponsored
by the organization.
C. Limits on Applying Section 702 to Employment Discriminationby
Religious Organizations:The Bright Line Between Religious and
Non-Religious Discrimination
Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Title VII's statutory exemption for all activities of religious institutions in Amos, clear limits on the extent to which churches could
assert immunity from federal employment discrimination claims
subsequently emerged in federal case law. These cases established
that, although the statutory exemption applies to the religious and
non-religious activities of religious organizations, as well as the organization's choice to discriminate on the basis of religion, it does
not protect discrimination based upon non-religious factors like
race, sex, or national origin.

57. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337-38. The Amos Court emphasized that government does not un.

constitutionally establish a religion by removing a burden for religious organizations that nonreligious entities must still bear. Id. Rebutting the argument that government must reciprocally lift such a burden for non-religious entities to comply with the Establishment Clause, the
Court stated, "[w]here, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation
that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities." Id. at 338.
58. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
59. Amos, 483 U.S. at 339.
60. Id.; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
61.Amos, 483 U.S. at 327. Specifically, the Court held that the rational basis test is the
proper inquiry for Section 702 as applied to religious entities, because the statutory exception
was neutral on its face and motivated by the permissible purpose of limiting governmental interference with the exercise of religion. Id.

2001]

LIMITING THE SANCTUARY

497

1. McClure v. Salvation Army
In McClure v. Salvation Army, the Fifth Circuit considered,
for the first time, whether Title VII's statutory religious institution
exemption applied to non-religious as well as religiously-based employment discrimination. 62 Both McClure and the EEOC argued
that the religious exemption only applied to discrimination on the
basis of religion; because the Salvation Army allegedly discriminated against Ms. McClure on the basis of sex, the exemption
should not apply.63 The McClure court accepted this argument and
defined the proper scope of the statutory religious organization exception as encompassing religious discrimination only.," In support
of this position, the court looked to the exemption's language and
legislative history.65 The court emphasized that the House and the
Senate compromised in enacting section 702; Congress adopted the
pared-down version offered by the Senate that, instead of granting
a blanket exception as the House version did, would exempt only
religious activities. 66 Drawing from the amendment's language and
legislative history, the McClure court then held that the religious
67
organization exception applied only to religious discrimination.
Consequently, because Ms. McClure's claim was for sex discrimination, rather than religious discrimination, the Salvation Army could
not claim exemption from Title VII liability under section 702. 68
2. EEOC v. Mississippi College
Although McClure clearly established that the Title VII
statutory exemption only applied to religious discrimination, Congress's amendment of section 702 shortly after McClure raised the
question of whether Congress intended to exempt non-religious discrimination by extending the statutory exemption to religious organizations' non-religious activities. In EEOC v. Mississippi College, the Fifth Circuit addressed this very question, ultimately re-

62. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 588 (5th Cir. 1972).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 12818 (1964)). Because the court heard the case early in
1972, it dealt solely with the exception as enacted, because Congress had not yet extended the
amendment to all activities of religious organizations.
67. Id. The arguments against extending the exception to non-religious discrimination were
especially strong, because the McClure court heard the case before Congress amended Section
702 to encompass non-religious as well as religious activities.
68. Id.
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jecting the expansion of religious immunity. 69 In Mississippi Col-

lege, Dr. Patricia Summers, a white female assistant professor,
brought suit against the religiously owned and operated college for
sex and race discrimination.70 Specifically, she alleged that Mississippi College unlawfully denied her a full-time teaching position on
the basis of sex, and that, although she was not a minority, the institution's alleged racial discrimination in hiring created a "working
environment heavily charged with discrimination."71 In its defense,
Mississippi College argued that section 702 precluded adjudication
of Summers' sex and race discrimination claims.7 2

69. EEOC v. Miss. College, 626 F.2d 477, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1980). In holding that Title VII's
statutory exception was limited to religious discrimination, the Mississippi College court construed the exception to be consistent with Congress's proscription of racial discrimination in Title
VII and in other sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 488-89. Furthermore, the court
"conclude[d] that the government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination is sufficient
to justify the minimal burden imposed upon the College's free exercise'of religious beliefs that
results from the application of Title VII." Id. at 489. At least one commentator has taken issue
with the Mississippi College court's balancing of Title VII's supposed interest in eradicating
discrimination with churches' free exercise rights. See David E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination
Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 133, 162 (asserting that the Mississippi Col.
lege court's reasoning with respect to the significance of balancing state interests in eradicating
discrimination with churches' free exercise rights was flawed because Title VII is a civil rather
than criminal statute, which "quite clearly did not manifest [Congress's] interest in eradicating
discrimination," and because Congress does not have the power to limit the scope of a constitutional right by manifesting an intent to do so). Bernstein argues that the Mississippi College
court overstated the extent to which Congress could and did seek to infringe upon religious institutions' Free Exercise rights in the course of pursuing its interest in ending discrimination. Id.
First, Bernstein asserts, the Constitution does not allow Congress to determine the extent to
which one group's constitutional rights may be slighted in order to promote the constitutional
rights of another group. Id. at 162-63. Second, Bernstein infers that, because Congress passed a
civil rather than a criminal statute to fight discrimination, the interest it was pursuing was not
as compelling as the Mississippi College court made it out to be. Id. Although Bernstein is undoubtedly correct about Congress's ability to define the scope of religious institutions' constitutional rights, his inference from Congress's choice of a civil statute to address discrimination is
not well-supported or well-reasoned. Congress pursues many compelling interests through civil
rather than criminal statutes.
70. Miss. College, 626 F.2d at 479-80.
71. Id. at 479-80, 482. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that
Summers lacked standing, concluding that Summers did have standing to assert racial discrimination, because she was entitled under Title VII to charge "a violation of her own personal right
to work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination." Id. at 483.
72. Id. at 484. The court considered Mississippi College a religious institution within the
meaning of Section 702 because it was owned and operated by the Mississippi Baptist Convention and sought to hire faculty committed to the principle that "the best preparation for life is a
program of cultural and human studies permeated by the Christian ideal, as evidenced by the
tenets, practices and customs of the Mississippi Baptist Convention and in keeping with the
principles and scriptures of the Bible." Id. at 479. Thus, in accordance with its right to discriminate based on religious criteria in hiring, the College favored active members of Baptist churches
for faculty positions. Id.
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According to the Mississippi College court, application of the
statutory exemption to Summers' sex discrimination claim ultimately turned on whether the college denied her the position because she was female or because she was not Baptist.73 The court
asserted that if Mississippi College refused to grant Summers a
full-time teaching position because she was not Baptist, this decision would be a proper exercise of the College's section 702 rights.74
If, however, Mississippi College could not present convincing evidence that it based its challenged employment decision on religious
grounds, the exception would not apply, and the EEOC would have
jurisdiction to investigate and proceed with the case because nonreligious discrimination is not exempted under section 702 of Title
VII.75
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF NON-RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION BY RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS: THE
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AS DEFINED IN MCCLURE V.
SALVATION ARMY
The statutory religious organization exemption under Title
VII is limited to discrimination on the basis of religion, and does
not exempt cases in which a religious organization discriminates
against employees based on non-religious criteria, regardless of
whether the organization acts for religious reasons. 76 Given courts'
concurrence in this narrow interpretation, the primary issues
raised by ministerial claims were constitutional. 77 The Fifth Circuit
and subsequent courts faced with Title VII claims by ministers
against church employers found intrinsic constitutional problems in
applying ostensibly neutral employment laws to church hiring decisions.78 It was because of these reservations about applying intru-

73. Id. at 484-85.
74. Id. at 484.
75. Id. at 485. The court noted that "[t]his interpretation of section 702 is required to avoid
the conflicts that would result between the rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the EEOCs exercise of jurisdiction over religious educational institutions." Id.
76. See supraPart H.C.
77. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972) (asking and

analyzing the question, "[d]oes the application of the provisions of Title VII to the relationship
between [defendant] and [plaintift] (a church and its minister) violate either of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment?").
78. Such constitutional issues stemmed from considering the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment in the context of Title VIrs application to ministerial
employment issues. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although these constitutional issues ako arise in a
variety of other contexts, this Note will discuss only the constitutional issues arising in the employment context.
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sive hiring standards to religious organizations, as well as the clear
statutory limitations of the religious exemption under section 702,79
80
that courts formulated the constitutional ministerial exception.
The ministerial exception is based on the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and exempts church employment decisions affecting ministerial employees; this exception fills in the gap left
open by section 702 and results in both religious and non-religious
employment discrimination against ministerial employees being
exempted from Title VII's application.
The Fifth Circuit was the first court to articulate a constitutional ministerial exception in McClure v. Salvation Army, holding
that the First Amendment precludes courts from intruding into the
employment relationship between a church and its ministerial employees. 8 ' McClure, a female officer and minister of the Salvation
Army, brought suit for the Army's allegedly discriminatory practices toward women ministers with regard to their assignments,
salaries, and duties.8 2 The Salvation Army had terminated
McClure, allegedly because she complained to her superiors and the
EEOC about the discrepancy between the monetary and nonmonetary benefits provided to similarly situated male and female
officers. 8 Because McClure's claim did not involve discrimination
on the basis of religion, the court held that section 702 did not exempt the Salvation Army's hiring practices in this case.8 4 Instead of
ending its analysis, however, the statutory exception's inapplicability brought the court to the question of whether applying Title
VII to the ministerial employment relationship in this case was
constitutional.8 5 In essence, the court's constitutional inquiry was
whether the First Amendment prohibits the adjudication of employment disputes stemming from the church/minister relationship.
The McClure court began its analysis by noting that, at numerous times, the Supreme Court has recognized a "wall of separation" that is to be maintained between church and State with re-

79.

See supra Part II.C (explaining that the statutory religious institution exemption pro-

tects only discrimination based on religious factors, not discrimination based on race, sex, or
national origin).
80. For the definition and scope of the ministerial exception, see infra Part IV.
81. McClure,460 F.2d at 559.
82. See supra Part 1.C.1.
83. McClure, 460 F.2d at 555.
84. Id. at 558.

85. Id. McClure's position was as an officer and minister of the Salvation Army, an organization determined in prior case law to constitute a "religious organization." Id. at 553-54.
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gard to religious matters. 86 Specifically,
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with respect to the

church/minister relationship, the court emphasized that "[tlhe relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church
seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must
necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern."87
When dealing with such matters, the court asserted that "the decisions of the proper church tribunals . . . although affecting civil

rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or
otherwise."' 8 Thus, courts have been hesitant to resolve secular controversies that implicate ecclesiastical questions in their
resolution.8 9 In deciding such cases, the McClure court emphasized,
"the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of
religious doctrine."90
Guided by this constitutional principle, the McClure court
expressed concern that litigating employment disputes involving a
church/minister relationship could result in governmental intrusion
on doctrinally significant matters such as church administration
and governance. 9 ' In the case at bar, the court concluded that the
application of Title VII to an employment dispute between the Salvation Army and one of its ministers would necessitate investigation and judicial review of the organization's employment practices
and decisions, "caus[ing] the State to intrude upon matters of
church administration and government which have so many times
before been proclaimed to be matters of a singular ecclesiastical
concern."9 2 Under such circumstances, courts would be substituting
their judgment with respect to ecclesiastical questions for that of
the church. 93

86. Id. at 558. The court explained that this wall, though it may blur and vary, must remain "highand impregnable." Id.
87. Id. at 558-59.

88. Id. at 559 (quoting Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929)).
89. Id.

90. Id. at 560 (citing United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'1 Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)).
91. Id. at 559-60.
92. Id. at 560.

93. Id. The McClure court and others courts feared that state regulation of the ministerial
relationship through application of federal employment discrimination laws would result in
government shaping religious doctrine. Id. They appeared most concerned that, instead of fo-

cusing on religious criteria in making clergy employment decisions, church leadership would be
forced to look primarily at secular requirements imposed by the state in employment discrimination laws. Id. (asserting that imposing employment discrimination laws may result in "inhibit-
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The McClure court was also concerned that investigating and
reviewing church employment decisions about ministers, in addition to "injecting the State into substantive ecclesiastical matters,"
could "produce by its coercive effect the very opposite of that separation of church and State contemplated by the First Amendment."94 Applying Title VII to an employment relationship between
a church and a minister would result in a constitutional violation,
according to the court, because of the resultant "encroachment by
the State into an area of religious freedom [that] it is forbidden to
enter by the principles of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment."95 Thus, due to Free Exercise and Establishment

ing the free development of religious doctrine and [in] implicating secular interests in matters of
purely ecclesiastical concern").
94. Id. Here, the McClure court suggested that Lemon's excessive entanglement prohibition
may be violated by adjudicating church/minister employment disputes. Id. (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)); see also infra note 114 and accompanying text (describ.
ing the "procedural entanglement!' issue that may arise from various forms of government regulation of religious institutions). Although the Supreme Court has refused to confine its Establishment Clause jurisprudence to the application of a solitary test since its decision in Lemon,
see, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (noting that the Court has "repeatedly
emphasized... [an] unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion"), courts evalu.
ating the Establishment Clause implications of the ministerial exception have employed the
Lemon analysis in a fairly uniform fashion, focusing primarily on the entanglement prong, see,
e.g., McClure, 460 F.2d at 559 (justifying the courts formulation of the constitutional ministerial
exception on the basis that it does not violate the Establishment Clause under Lemon). For a
brief synopsis of the Lemon test and its subsequent history, see supra text accompanying notes
30-34. Considering that Lemon involved financial aid to religious institutions, the Lemon test
provides the most appropriate Establishment Clause analysis for the ministerial exception be.
cause, similar to government aid, the ministerial exception potentially provides a financial bene.
fit to religious institutions in the form of immunity from monetary damages for certain statutory
claims for which they would otherwise be subject to financial liability.
95. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560. In its Free Exercise analysis, the McClure court discussed
the requirement under Sherbert v. Verner for a compelling state interest when a law imposes
even an incidental burden on Free Exercise of religion. Id. at 558 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 403 (1963)). Although strict scrutiny is no longer appropriate for a Free Exercise challenge to a neutral, generally applicable law such as Title VII in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division,Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
the Smith case does not necessarily undermine the doctrinal underpinnings of the ministerial
exception, because it is unclear that the ministerial exception is solely rooted in the pinciple of
strict scrutiny for Free Exercise claims. See infra note 139. Clearly, the McClure court did not
specifically apply strict scrutiny, because the coures opinion includes no language requiring
federal regulation of church employment disputes to be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling
state interest. Rather, instead of citing cases establishing strict scrutiny for Free Exercise
claims, the McClure court explained the constitutional necessity for the ministerial exception by
relying primarily on cases establishing a general First Amendment right for churches to be free
from intrusions into church governance. Id. at 558-60 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivo.
jevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)). An additional post-Smith argument for the ministerial exception's
continuing validity is the accommodation doctrine, which permits the exemption of religious
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Clause concerns, the McClure court established the constitutionally-based ministerial exception, which provides religious organizations with immunity from Title VII claims by ministerial employees. 96 The constitutional ministerial exception has been widely
adopted in numerous jurisdictions, yet never specifically acknowledged or defined by the Supreme Court.
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION: How
"MINISTERS" ARE DEFINED

Following McClure, religious institutions enjoyed two forms
of Title VII protection. In addition to Section 702's statutory exemption from claims of religious discrimination, the McClure court
granted churches a constitutionally-based ministerial exception,
providing them with immunity from suits brought by ministers for
sex, race, and national origin discrimination. Courts next confronted the issue of what constituted a "minister" for purposes of
the constitutional exception. Clear definition was necessary in order to prevent churches' sphere of protection from becoming too inclusive of their non-religious acts.97 The predominant test for application of the ministerial exception emerged as a bright line test
used to determine the extent to which a church's employment decisions could be considered sufficiently rooted in religious belief or
practice to implicate the First Amendment's Religion Clauses.93
The "primary duties of the plaintiff' test, developed in large part by
the Fourth Circuit in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, has been widely accepted and applied by courts presented with ministerial exception defenses. 99

institutions from neutral laws of general applicability so long as the exemption does not amount
to an impermissible establishment of religion. See supranote 26.
96. See infra Part IV for a discussion of which types of employees can be considered "ministerial" for purposes of the ministerial exception.
97. Considering that the constitutional ministerial exception is based in part on Free Exercise principles, courts presented with ministerial exception defenses were mindful that, at a
minimum, such claims "must be rooted in religious belief." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215

(1972).
98. For an explanation of the constitutional considerations underlying courts' adoption of
the ministerial exception, see supra Part Im.
99. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir.
1985) (asserting that application of the ministerial exception depends on the "function of the
position" of the plaintiff).
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A. The PrimaryDuties of the PlaintiffAnalysis
Although McClure v. Salvation Army, the case originally establishing the ministerial exception, involved sex discrimination, 100
other cases soon followed in which religious organizations asserted
.aconstitutional ministerial exception as a defense to other types of
discrimination, including race and age discrimination.'10 As the
ministerial exception jurisprudence evolved, however, courts began
to focus more heavily on the nature of the employment position at
issue as a method to restrict the scope of the constitutional ministerial exception, and less on the character of the substantive claim.
In Rayburn v. Seventh-Day Adventists, the Fourth Circuit articulated a test for the application of the ministerial exception, focusing on the plaintiffs primary employment duties. 102 In Rayburn,
a white female member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church
brought race and sex discrimination claims against the church after
it hired a different candidate for an associate pastor position. 03
Recognizing that Title VII did not exempt all allegations of
employment discrimination by religious organizations, the Rayburn
court sought to find a balance between the purpose of Title VII and
the mandate of the Religion Clauses. 04 To do so, the court looked to
the function of the plaintiffs current or desired employment position and held that a constitutional ministerial exception should apply "if the employee's primary duties consist of teaching, spreading

100. McClure, 460 F.2d at 553.
101. See, e.g., Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 185-87
(7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the application of Title VII to a female African-American minister's sex
and race discrimination claims because of First Amendment concerns); Scharon v. St. Luke's
Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the application
of Title VII and the ADEA to a hospital chaplain's sex and age discrimination claims was constitutionally barred because adjudicating such claims would violate the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171 (holding that the First
Amendment barred consideration of sex and race discrimination claims by a white female applicant for a pastoral position).
102. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
103. Id. at 1164-65. The associate in pastoral care position for which the plaintiff applied
was designated for individuals who had completed seuiinary training but were not ordained. Id.
Such positions could be held by women who obtained seminary training but could not be ordained according to the Seventh-Day Adventist requirements. Id. at 1165.
104. Id. at 1168-71. As a threshold inquiry, the Rayburn court first examined whether the
Title VII statutory exemption protected race or sex discrimination by a religious organization.
Id. It concluded that, although section 702 of Title VII exempted employment practices in which
a church could prove by "convincing evidence" that religion was the discriminating factor, '"Title
VII [did] not confer upon religious organizations a license to make those same decisions on the
basis of race, sex, or national origin." Id. at 1166. Thirteen years prior to Rayburn, the Fifth
Circuit in McClure made a similar determination, holding that section 702 did not allow for the
exemption of discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558.
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the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or
supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship."10 5 If
the court found the plaintiffs current or desired position within the
church was sufficiently spiritual, then judicial involvement in the
dispute would cease because of the "constitutional concern for the
unfettered right of the church to resolve certain questions."106 In
reaching this conclusion, the Rayburn court drew from two Supreme Court decisions: Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral and Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.Milivojevich, which established the principle that ecclesiastical issues, including the choice of a religious
group's spiritual leaders, are "generally inviolate."' 07 When presented with a claim involving such a decision, courts should defer to
the church in these matters and refrain from adjudicating related
disputes. 08
In its adoption of the primary duties of the plaintiff test, the
Rayburn court also relied on First Amendment Establishment and
Free Exercise principles. 09 With respect to the Seventh-Day Adventists' Free Exercise rights, the Rayburn court balanced church
and state interests to determine how exempting the relevant church
practice from state regulation would impede the state's broad
regulatory goals.1 0 The employment decision at issue in Rayburn
involved the selection of an employee who would be a liaison between the church and "those whom it would touch with its message."' The court therefore concluded that the church's interest in
selecting the candidate of its choice outweighed the state's interest

105. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (citing Bruce N. Bagni, Discriminationin the Name of the
Lord. A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations,79 COLUM. L. REV.

1514, 1545 (1979)). Professor Bagni advocates a ministerial exception test based on a concentric
circles model in which religious organizations would be exempt from federal employment laws for
their core spiritual activities with amenability to suit increasing with the secular nature of the
organization's pursuits. Bagni, supra, at 1539-41. Activities within the "epicenter would include the relationship between a church and its clergy, modes of worship and ritual, religious
education, and possibly church-operated schools with a religious orientation. Id. The first"emanation" would include the relationship between churches and support employees with some religious functions as well as church-sponsored community activities like hospitals and primarily
secular church-operated schools. Al. Finally, the second circle would contain a religious organization's "purely secular" business activities and its relationships with employees performing
nonspiritual functions. Id.
106. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
107. Id. at 1167-68 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in
N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713
(1976)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1168-71.
110. Id. at 1168 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 205 (1972)).
111. Id.
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in eradicating discrimination, even if the church was effectively dis2
criminating on the basis of a factor other than religion."
Additionally, the court determined that adjudicating Rayburn's claim would cause excessive entanglement of church and
state in violation of the Establishment Clause." 3 Such entanglement, the court stated, would occur at the substantive level, because selection for the position involved evaluating subjective religious factors such as "spirituality," and at the procedural level by
"pitting church and state as adversaries" in a protracted legal process. 114 Thus, the court concluded that the church's selection of its
pastoral associate was an area constitutionally designated to be offlimits for governmental involvement. 115 In making this determination, the Rayburn court primarily examined the function of the employment position at issue rather than the type of claim." 6 This
"primary duties of the plaintiff' analysis, focusing on the function of
the plaintiffs current or desired employment position to determine
application of the ministerial exception, became the standard inquiry in employment discrimination claims against church defendants.

112. Id. at 1169-70. The position of associate in pastoral care involved leading Bible studies,
occasional preaching, counseling a singles group, and leading the congregation in certain rites of
worship. Id. at 1168.
113. Id. at 1170-71. Applying the Supreme Courts entanglement analysis from Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971), the court examined the "character and purposes" of the
institution affected, the nature of the benefit or burden imposed, and the "resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority." Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1170.
114. Id. at 1170-71. The concept of "procedural entanglement" originated from the Supreme
Courts decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), in which the Court
held that applying the National Labor Relations Act to church-operated schools and requiring
them to bargain collectively could result in extensive and ongoing monitoring by the state in
violation of the Establishment Clause. Compare NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 505
(1979) (declining to construe the National Labor Relations Act as applying to church.operated
schools because of Establishment Clause violations), with Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of
Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305 (1985) (subjecting religious organizations to "routine and factual inquiries" of the Fair Labor Standards Act does not constitute sufficient government surveillance
to raise an Establishment Clause concern), and Lukaszewski v. Nazareth Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 57,
60 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (distinguishing between the continuous involvement of the NLRB in enforcing
collective bargaining agreements and the EEOCs isolated involvement on a case-by-case basis in
investigating allegations of age discrimination).
115. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1172.
116. Although the court grounded its decision in both Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, it arguably stretched the limits of the procedural entanglement issue in
stating that mere inquiry into the alleged discrimination would impermissibly entangle church
and state. In cases defining procedural entanglement subsequent to NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, courts have generally refused to accept such an argument when the statute at issue
does not require ongoing monitoring to the extent that the National Labor Relations Act does.
See supra note 114.
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B. Stretching the Limits of the Definition of a MinisterialEmployee
In the original case setting forth the constitutional ministerial exception, McClure v. Salvation Army, the court only needed to
explain why the employment relationship between a church and its
minister was essential to the church's religious mission and therefore deserved protection from state regulation.11 7 There was no
question that the plaintiff was a minister; adjudicating the plaintiffs case would necessarily intrude into the church/minister relationship.118 After McClure's establishment of a constitutional ministerial exception, however, religious organizations saw an opportunity to further shield themselves from federal employment discrimination laws. They argued that certain employees, such as
21
teachers," 9 administrative employees, 2 0 and music directors,'
should be included within the ministerial exception's purview, because these employees' duties were sufficiently religious to make
them essential to the church's religious mission. The success of such
claims ultimately turned upon the extent to which the employees'
12
duties involved the church's essential religious functions. 2
1. The Extent of the Ministerial Exception's Application to
Religious Schools: EEOC v. Mississippi College and EEOC v.
Southwestern Baptist Seminary
Nearly a decade after the Fifth Circuit articulated and applied the constitutional ministerial exception, it confronted the issue of which types of employment positions were sufficiently religious to come within the scope of the exception, and which positions
were subject to Title VII claim adjudication in the context of
church-operated schools.1l 3 EEOC v. Mississippi College and EEOC

117. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-60 (5th Cir. 1972).
118. Id.

119. See infra Part 1V.B.1.
120. See infra Part IV.B.2.
121. See infra Part IV.B.3.
122. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169

(4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the application of the ministerial exception was contingent upon
whether "the employee's primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and wor-

ship" (quoting Bagni, supra note 105, at 1545)); see also Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 17677 (5th Cir. 1999) (examining whether the plaintiff was "engaged in activities traditionally con-

sidered ecclesiastical or religious" (quoting EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary,
651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 49 (2000).
123. See EEOC v. Miss. College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980); Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d
at 277. Prior to Mississippi College and Southwestern Baptist, the major cases in which religious

associations advanced a ministerial exception defense did not present the issue of whether the
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Seminary reflect the Fifth Cirv. Southwestern Baptist Theological
124
cuit's attempt to resolve this issue.
Both Mississippi College and Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary arose in the context of EEOC efforts to require
church-operated schools' compliance with Title VIIs reporting and
investigative requirements. 125 Yet although the types of claims in
these two cases were similar, the court's holdings in each diverged
significantly depending on the extent to which the defendants pursued a religious mission. In response to arguments that the ministerial exception should apply in Mississippi College, the court distinguished the case at bar from its holding in McClure v. Salvation
Army by emphasizing that the McClure court's decision was restricted to the context of the church-minister relationship. 126 In the
case at bar, the facts were distinguishable because the College was
not a church. 127 Since the Mississippi College faculty did not include
anyone whose role was to function as an "intermediar[y] between a
church and its congregation," the ministerial exception did not protect Mississippi College's faculty appointment decisions. 128 In de-

employment position at hand could be adequately classified as a ministerial position, because the
plaintiff clearly performed ministerial functions. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d
553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972). Thus, the court hearing the dispute could simply state that the ministerial relationship it was asked to examine constituted the "lifeblood" of the church and therefore
was not subject to state intervention. See Southwestern Baptist,651 F.2d at 284 (referring to the
Fifth Circuits application of the ministerial exception to the plaintiff in McClure and stating,
"[t]he failure of any party to challenge [plaintiffs] 'status as a minister engaged in the religious
or ecclesiastical activities of the church' relieved this court from clearly explicating the test for
such a determination in that case").
124.Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 277; Miss. College, 626 F.2d at 477.
125. The dispute in Mississippi College stemmed from Mississippi College's refusal to voluntarily comply with the EEOGs request for information necessary for the EEOC to investigate a
part-time faculty member's charge of sexual discrimination. Miss. College, 626 F.2d at 479-80.
As a consequence of the college's refusal to cooperate, the EEOC sought enforcement of a subpoena to compel production of the necessary information. Id. at 480-81. In Southwestern Baptist, the EEOC brought suit to compel the seminary to file biennial EEO-6 forms, which would
reveal each employee's general job description, length of employment contract, salary bracket,
gender, and race or national origin. Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 280.
126. Miss. College, 626 F.2d at 485.
127. Id.
128. Id. Before addressing the issue of whether the constitutional ministerial exception applied, the court first noted that the statutory language and legislative history of Title VII did not
indicate any intent for religious organizations to be exempt from charges of discrimination based
on any factor other than religion. Id. at 484 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1). Consequently, if the
EEOC found that the only discriminatory policy Mississippi College followed was its preference
for Baptists, the College was excepted from a Title VII claim. Id. Implicit in this holding was a
rejection of the procedural entanglement argument from NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
440 U.S. 490, 505 (1979), in which the Supreme Court held application of the NLRA to church
institutions would necessarily create excessive entanglement of church and state because of the
extensive monitoring by the NLRB that would result. Id. Investigating the type of alleged dis.
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fining which types of employment selections should be protected
from governmental scrutiny under the ministerial exception, the
Mississippi College court emphasized two important ministerial
functions absent from the faculty's job duties at Mississippi College:
"attending to the religious needs of the faithful' and "instructing
students in the whole of religious doctrine."'m Without satisfying
these requirements, Mississippi College could not claim their fac-

ulty members were tantamount to ministers and thereby protect
itself from claims of both religious
and non-religious
discrimination. 18 0
In EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, the
Fifth Circuit confronted the issue of whether seminary faculty,
staff, and administrators necessarily qualified as ministers if they
were so designated by the school.13 1 The court once again focused
on the actual duties of the "ministers." 132 Because they provided
religious instruction to future ministers and served as intermedi-

aries between the future ministers and the Baptist Convention, the
court concluded that seminary faculty members did indeed qualify
as "ministers" for purposes of the exception.13 3 The court refused to
grant the same status to the seminary support staff, despite the
seminary's contention that the title should apply since several staff

positions were held by actual ordained ministers. 134 Finding that

crimination in Mississippi College, religious or non-religious, was not only constitutionally permitted by the lack of ongoing authority that would be asserted by the EEOC, but it was also

required in order to determine whether the College had preferred Baptists over non-Baptists or
men over women. Miss. College, 626 F.2d at 485. Thus, the EEOC investigation would be determinative of whether Mississippi College could successfully protect the integrity of its hiring
policies under the statutory exemption. Id. at 484-85.
129. Id. at 485. The court'stated that expectations for the faculty members "to serve as exemplars of practicing Christians [did] not serve to make the terms and conditions of their employment matters of church administration and thus purely of ecclesiastical concern." Id.
130. Although the MississippiCollege court held that the constitutional ministerial exception
did not apply to the plaintiffs, the College would nevertheless be protected from claims of religious discrimination under the statutory exception to Title VII for religious employers. 42 U.S.C.
§ 200Oe-1 (1994); supraPart II.C.
131. EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283-84 (5th Cir.
Unit A July 1981). The Southwestern Baptist court specifically distinguished the facts of the
case at bar from the facts of Mississippi College by highlighting the difference in religious intensity of the two schools as well as the future occupational divergence of the schools' student
populations. Id. Thus, regardless of whether or not unequal treatment on the basis of sex or
race was a tenet held by the Baptist Convention, the Baptist Convention was authorized to discriminate on that basis in hiring faculty for its seminariesbut not for its other colleges. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. Accord Shirkey v. Eastwind Cmty. Dev. Corp., 941 F. Supp. 567, 577-78 (D. Md.
1996) (holding that although the employment of a minister was at issue, the secular nature of
the position precluded application of the ministerial exception), modified, 993 F. Supp. 370 (D.
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ordination was not a requirement for these positions, and that the
functions performed were not ecclesiastical or religious in nature,
the court concluded that support staff were not covered by the
13 5
ministerial exception.
After determining that the ministerial exception did not apply to employment decisions regarding non-religious staff members
of the Seminary, the court then examined whether applying Title
VII's reporting requirements would nevertheless violate the First
Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. 13 6 These
independent constitutional inquiries were necessary to determine
whether, despite the inapplicability of the ministerial exception,
either of the Religion Clauses would require or prohibit government
from treating the defendant like similarly situated non-religious
defendants. The implication of the court's separate treatment of the
defendant's ministerial exception and constitutional defenses is
that the ministerial exception need not provide the exclusive means
by which religious institutions assert a constitutional argument
against the application of Title VII. Rather, accommodation of religious exercise may also be accomplished independent of the ministerial exception.
Applying Lemon's anti-entanglement principle, 187 the Southwestern Baptist court concluded that application of Title VII reporting requirements would not violate the Establishment Clause
because the requirement did not result in ongoing interference with
the seminary's religious practices, so the resultant relationship be-

Md. 1998), affid, No. 99-1841, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32387 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 1999); Welter v.
Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206, 215-16 (N.J. 1992) (declining to exempt nuns' breach of contract
claim on First Amendment grounds because their teaching positions in the university did not
involve "imbuing with Roman Catholic values" any of the students they encountered). But see
Carter v. Baltimore Annual Conference, No. 86-2543 SSH, 1987 WL 18470, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 5,
1987) (holding that an ordained minister's race discrimination suit failed to state a cause of
action because, although the minister served in a non-religious administrative capacity, ministerial relationships are constitutionally exempted from adjudication regardless of the capacity in
which the minister serves).
135. Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 282. For a discussion criticizing the proposition that
courts rather than churches should be able to define "which positions [are] ministerial and central to the religion," see Treaver Hodson, Comment, The Religious Employer Exemption Under
Title I. Should a ChurchDefine Its Own Activities?, 1994 BYU L. REV. 571, 585-87 (asserting
that the Ninth Circuit risked influencing religious doctrine by immediately dismissing the possi.
bility of a constitutional exception to a religious organization's employment decision regarding its
allegedly secular employees without examining whether the decision was religiously based).
136. See Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284-86.
137. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612.13 (1971) (holding that the Establishment
Clause requires a law regulating religious institutions to have a secular purpose, a primary
effect that neither inhibits nor advances religion, and must not result in excessive entanglement
of church and state).

2001]

LIMTING THE SANCTUARY

511

tween church and state was "minimal."1 38 The court also rejected
the seminary's Free Exercise Clause objection to applying Title VII
because the seminary did not hold any religious tenet requiring discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, or national origin, such
that enforcing the relevant Title VII prohibitions would burden the
exercise of any sincerely held religious belief.139 Thus, in EEOC v.

138. Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 286. Although neither party made a procedural entanglement argument, the court implicitly distinguished this case from NLRB v. CatholicBishop
of Chicago by emphasizing that the extent of the church-state relationship resulting from enforcing a biennial reporting requirement would be slight. Id. at 285 (citing NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979)).
139. In evaluating whether application of Title VII to the non-ministerial employees would
violate the Free Exercise Clause, the Southwestern Baptist court applied the level of scrutiny set
forth by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and refined in Wsconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 286. In these Free Exercise
cases, the Court examined. (1) the magnitude of the statute's impact upon the exercise of the
religious belief (2) whether the state had a compelling state interest justifying the burden im-

posed upon the exercise of the belief, and (3) the extent to which recognition of an exemption
from the statute would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the state. Id. (citing
Yoder and Sherbert). The Free Exercise analysis in the context of the ministerial exception was
complicated after the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). In Smith, the Court held that laws of general
applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause when enforced against religious organizations. Id. at 879. The D.C. Circuit specifically addressed the question of whether the ministerial
exception survived the holding of Smith in EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455,
460-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The D.C. Circuit held that Smith did not affect the ministerial exception
for two reasons. Catholic Univ. 83 F.3d at 462. First, the Catholic University court distinguished
the institutional Free Exercise right addressed by the ministerial exception from the individual
Free Exercise right involved in Smith. Id. Because the ministerial exception protects the right
of a congregationto select its ministers, the danger in Smith that an individual may "by virtue of
his beliefs... become a law unto himself' is not an issue in applying the ministerial exception.
Id. Second, the Catholic University court asserted that although the Fifth Circuit mentioned the
compelling interest test in McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972), the
doctrinal foundations of the ministerial exception did not necessarily require application of the
compelling interest test. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462. Rather, courts applying the ministerial
exception have relied on Supreme Court precedent establishing the fundamental right of
churches to decide questions of church doctrine and governance free from government intervention. Id. (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871) (stating that "questions of discipline,
or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law' [that] have been decided by the highest of...
church judicatories ...must [be] accept[ed] as final"); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (emphasizing the fundamental right of
churches to "decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as
well as those of faith and doctrine")). Therefore, because the legitimacy of the ministerial exception does not directly depend on the continued viability of Sherbert or the applicability of the
compelling interest test, the court in Catholic University held that the ministerial exception
survived the Smith decision. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462. Following the D.C. Circuits lead,
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have similarly held that the ministerial exception remains a
valid defense to the application of Title VII after Smith. In so holding, both circuits focused on
the difference between the state's interference with an individual's right to observe the practices
of his religion, as in Smith, and the state's interference with a church's right to self-governance,
as in the ministerial exception cases. See Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church,
Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000) (asserting that the ministerial exception does not
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Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and EEOC v. Mississippi College, the Fifth Circuit established two important principles
for religious organizations seeking to insulate their employment
decision-making process from judicial review. First, a church's classification of employees as "ministers" will not be conclusive; rather,
a court will independently examine the duties of the position to determine if the position is so central to the organization's religious
mission as to require non-intervention. 140 Second, even if a religious
organization does not succeed in convincing a court that a particular employment position is sufficiently religious to apply the ministerial exception, the church may still argue that application of the
statute would impermissibly entangle church and state if the ensuing church/state relationship would be substantial or adjudication would impermissibly burden the exercise of religious beliefs.141
2. Administrative Employees in Church-Operated Secular
Activities: EEOC v. Pacific Press PublishingAssociation
Despite the ministerial exception's facial limitation to "ministers,"'42 church defendants faced with employment discrimination
claims by non-ministerial employees have asserted that all employment decisions by churches should be protected by the exception. In EEOC v. Pacific Press PublishingAss'n, the Ninth Circuit
rejected a religiously-affiliated publisher's argument that its employment of administrative staff should be protected by the minis48
terial exception or by the First Amendment's Religion Clauses.1

"subvert [Smith's] concern" that an individual might become a law unto himself because the
exception "was not developed to provide protection to individuals who wish to observe a religious
practice that contravenes a generally applicable law," but rather "only continues a long-standing
tradition that churches are to be free from government interference in matters of church governance and administration"); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church,
173 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (asserting that because the concerns raised in Smith with an
individual avoiding neutral, generally applicable laws are different from the concerns in the
ministerial exception cases, Smith does not require that the ministerial exception be abandoned
by courts).
140. Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 282. But see Hodson, supra note 135, at 584-85 (arguing that the church, rather than a court, is the proper institution to define which employment
positions are essential to the church's spiritual mission).
141. See Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284-86.
142. See supra Part IV.A for an explanation of how courts have defined "ministers" for purposes of the ministerial exception.
143. EEOC v. Pac. Press Pubrg Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278-82 (9th Cir. 1982). The religious
organization also made a statutory interpretation argument that Title VII should not apply to
any employment decisions by a religious organization, but the court concluded otherwise, drawing upon congressional intent indicated in the legislative history. Id. at 1276-77 ('CTho legislative
history shows that Congress consistently rejected proposals to allow religious employers to dis-
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The plaintiff in this case, an editorial secretary, filed a sex discrimination suit alleging Pacific Press maintained a genderdifferentiated pay scale and reassigned plaintiffs administrative
and discretionary duties because of her participation in a coworker's sex discrimination proceedings. 14 In response, Pacific
Press argued that Title VII could not constitutionally be applied to
its employment relationship with the plaintiff because the plaintiffs job involved religious activities, thereby invoking application
of the ministerial exception. 145
The court rejected Pacific Press' ministerial exception argument and adopted a narrow interpretation of the exception, drawing
from the Fifth Circuit's decisions in Mississippi College and Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. 46 Because the plaintiff was
not an "intermediar[y] between a church and its congregation" and
her administrative and discretionary duties did not involve "attend[ing] to the religious needs of the faithful" or "instruct[ing] students in the whole of religious doctrine," she could not be considered a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception. 147 Pacific
Press argued, however, that even if the plaintiff were not covered
by the ministerial exception, applying Title VII to any employment
relationship involving a religious organization would violate the
First Amendment's Religion Clauses. 148
The court analyzed the constitutionality of applying Title VII
to church employment decisions affecting non-ministerial employees to demonstrate why the ministerial exception's application
should be limited to ministerial employees. In response to Pacific
Press's contention that applying Title VII to its employment decisions would necessarily violate the Free Exercise Clause, the court
concluded that the argument lacked merit because the publisher's
affiliated church, the Seventh-Day Adventists, held no belief requiring discrimination on the basis of sex that would be burdened
by state regulation. 149 Moreover, the state's interest in eradicating

criminate on grounds other than religion: '(church-affiliated) organizations remain subject to the
provisions of Title VII with regard to race, color, sex or national origin: ") (quoting 118 CONG.

REC. 7167 (1972))).
144. Id. at 1274.
145. Id. at 1277-78. The court characterized plaintiffs administrative and secretarial duties
as "discretionary and administrative" without further description. Id.
146. Id. (citing EEOC v. liss. College, 626 F.2d 477, 484 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283-85 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)).
147. Id. (citing Miss. College, 626 F.2d at 484).
148. Id. at 1279.
149. Id.; see also supra note 139 (setting forth the Free Exercise analysis from Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), as well as the change
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discrimination clearly exceeded any interest Pacific Press had in
discriminating on the basis of sex. 150
This trilogy of cases, EEOC v. Mississippi College, EEOC v.
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, and EEOC v. Pacific
Press Publishing Ass'n, thus illustrates the methodology courts
have traditionally applied when evaluating ministerial exception
claims by religious organizations for cases in which the existence of
a true ministerial relationship is questionable. First, courts have
established that a church's characterization of the position at issue
will not be determinative. 151 Rather, the church must demonstrate
that the employee acts in an intermediary capacity between the
church and its congregation. 152 In evaluating the church's argument, a court will inquire whether the individual "attended to the
religious needs of the faithful" or "instructed students in the whole
of religious doctrine." 153 Absent these factors, the church's employment decisions with respect to this employee will not be covered by
the ministerial exception. This does not end the analysis, however,
as the church can still argue that applying the regulation at issue
to the particular employment decision would burden the church's
Free Exercise of religion or would result in an impermissible entan5 4
glement of church and state from the resultant relationship.

in Free Exercise jurisprudence effectuated by Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)).
150. Pac.Press, 676 F.2d at 1279. Pacific Press also failed in its argument that applying Ti.
tle VIrs proscription against sex discrimination would result in impermissible procedural entanglement because, unlike the application of the National Labor Relations Act collective bargaining
provisions to churches in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, "neither the judgment in this suit
nor Title VII's enforcement mechanisms [would] result in any ongoing scrutiny of Pacific Press'
operations." Id. at 1282; see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502-03 (1979) (holding
that applying the National Labor Relations Act to a church-operated school would violate the
Establishment Clause because it would result in an ongoing, and thus impermissible, relation.
ship between church and state). Thus, enforcing Title VII's mandate against sex discrimination
would not give rise to a violation of either Religion Clause, leaving no constitutional impediment
to applying Title VII to administrative employees of church-operated organizations. Pac. Press,
676 F.2d at 1279.
151. Southwestern Baptist,651 F.2d at 282.
152. Id. at 283 ('nthis case, the faculty are intermediaries between the Convention and the
future ministers of many local Baptist churches."); Miss. College, 626 F.2d at 485 C"Tho faculty
members are not intermediaries between a church and its congregation.").
153. Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283-85 (emphasizing that the college faculty at issue
instructed seminarians "in the whole of religious doctrine"); Miss. College, 626 F.2d at 485
(holding that the Mississippi College faculty members were not ministers because they "neither
attend to the religious needs of the faithful nor instruct students in the whole of religious doctrine").
154. Pac. Press, 676 F.2d at 1279 (continuing Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
analyses after rejecting application of ministerial exception).

2001]

LTNG THE SANCTUARY

515

3. Ministerial Employees? The Case of the Church Musicians
Although courts generally abide by the proposition from
EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary that religious
organizations' classification of employees as "ministers" does not
control their legal status,155 deference to religious organizations'
designation of ministerial employees within the church has increased such that churches have been able to bring increasing
numbers of their employees within the definition of "ministers."156
While religious organizations have had trouble convincing courts
that teachers in religiously-operated schools should be considered
ministerial employees, 157 churches have successfully argued that
certain church actors besides ministers should be covered by the
158
ministerial exception.
One employment position courts have increasingly accepted as
"ministerial" for the purpose of applying the ministerial exception is
that of the church musician or church organist. 159 Although this
may not intuitively seem to fall within the ministerial classification, various churches have successfully made this argument by
showing that the musician's duties are sufficiently religious to be
comparable to a minister's duties.16 0 In Starkman v. Evans, for example, the Fifth Circuit held a church music director's Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") claim could not be litigated because
the plaintiff was a "minister" whose employment relationship with
the church was subject to the ministerial exception.161 Despite the

155. See, e.g., Starkman v. Evans, 18 F. Supp. 2d 630, 633 (E.D. La. 1998), offid, 198 F.3d
173 (5th Cir. 1999) CAn individual's designation by an organization is neither necessary nor
sufficient to control the designee's 'extra-religious legal status." (quoting Southwestern Baptist,
651 F.2d at 283)), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 49 (2000).
156. See, eg., Starkman, 198 F.3d at 177 (classifying a church music director as a "minister"
whose employment was covered by the ministerial exception); Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a church organist was a minister
for purposes of applying the ministerial exception).
157. See e.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to
exclude the relationship between a teacher and a private religious school from application of the
ADEA); Miss. College, 626 F.2d at 477 (holding that Congress intended, and the First Amendment did not preclude, the employment relationship between a religious university and its faculty to be regulated by Title VII). But see, e.g., Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283-84 (classifying seminary faculty as ministers covered by the ministerial exception); Maguire v. Marquette
Univ., 627 F. Supp. 1499, 1504-05 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (holding that the First Amendment barred
adjudication of a theology professor's employment discrimination claim), offd on other grounds,
814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987).
158. See, e.g., Starkman, 198 F.3d at 177; Assemany, 434 N.W.2d at 238.
159. See, e.g., Starkman, 198 F.3d at 177; Assemany, 434 N.W.2d at 238.
160. See, e.g., Starkman, 198 F.3d at 177; Assemany, 434 N.W.2d at 238.
161. Starkman, 198 F.3d at 177. The plaintiff had sued the church for failing to modify her
work schedule to allow her to recuperate from knee surgery and refusing to accommodate certain
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ministerial clause's origin in Title VII jurisprudence, the Starkman
court applied the exception to the plaintiffs ADA claim because of
162
the similar anti-discrimination purpose underlying both statutes.
The Fifth Circuit held the Free Exercise Clause precluded
adjudication of the plaintiffs claim, because she was not only a music director but also a "minister" for purposes of applying the ministerial exception.163 In concluding a music director could be considered a minister, the Starkman court appeared to depart from the
test it previously used to determine ministerial status. Whereas the
Fifth Circuit traditionally examined the nature of the plaintiffs job
to determine if it involved "attending to the religious needs of the
faithful" or "instructing students in the whole of religious doctrine,"
the Starkman court applied a multi-factor analysis of the plaintiff s

chemical sensitivities she had acquired. Id. at 174. The plaintiff also sued one of the church
ministers individually. Id. The court dismissed this claim, however, because the minister did
not qualify as an "employer" under the ADA. Id.
162. Starkman, 198 F.3d at 175. Although the church argued that both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause precluded adjudication of the plaintiffs claim, the Fifth
Circuit addressed only the Free Exercise issue. Id. at 174-77. By refusing to find an Establishment Clause issue in the adjudication of a religious employee's employment discrimination
claim, the Starkman court followed the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' approach, which distinguishes
cases such as Starkman's from NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pae.
Press Pub'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1282 (9th Cir. 1981) C"The present case is distinguishable
from NLRB v. CatholicBishop because neither the judgment nor Title VII's enforcement mechanisms result in any ongoing scrutiny of [defendants]operations."); EEOC v. Miss. College, 626
F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980) (No ongoing interference with the College's religious practices will
result from an EEOC investigation of the charge filed by [plaintiff]."). In evaluating Establishment Clause defenses of churches in employment discrimination cases, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have not examined the particular facts of each case; rather, they reject the argument if
enforcement of the statute at issue requires no ongoing interference with a church employment
relationship. On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit has evaluated churches' Establishment Clause
defenses on a case-by-case basis to determine whether an agency investigation would be excessively intrusive or whether adjudication would require a court to "evaluate competing opinions
on religious subjects." EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 465-67 (D.C. Cir. 1906)
(holding that a Catholic nun's sex discrimination case against Catholic University should be
dismissed on Establishment Clause grounds because the EEOC's investigation, pro-trial inquiries, and the trial itself resulted in "an impermissible entanglement with judgments that fell
within the exclusive province of the Department of Canon Law as a pontifical institution"). Because the Catholic University court concluded that adjudication of this case would result in both
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause problems, the Catholic University court held it fell
within the "hybrid" exception to the Smith rule, which allows for heightened scrutiny when the
plaintiff can assert a Free Exercise claim in conjunction with another viable constitutional claim.
Id. (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (articulating the basic rule that neutral laws of general applicability, such as Title VII, pose no Free
Exercise problems when they burden religious exercise)). Implicitly finding that a protracted
relationship between church and state would not result from the adjudication of an isolated ADA
claim, the Starkman court did not engage in an Establishment Clause analysis of the plaintiffs
ADA claim, in accordance with Fifth Circuit precedent.
163. Starkman, 198 F.3d at 175.
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job duties.'r' The first factor the court considered was whether the
church's decision to employ the plaintiff was based "largely on religious criteria."165 Although the plaintiff argued that she was hired
because of her abilities as a choral director, the court held the
church satisfied the first factor by showing the position required
coursework in the Bible and theology, as well as the organization of
religious music which "play[ed] a highly important role in the spiritual mission of the church."1 66 Second, the Starkman court considered whether the plaintiff was "qualified and authorized to perform
the [church's] ceremonies."'167 In evaluating this factor, the court
focused on the plaintiffs Answers to Interrogatories, which classified nineteen of her job duties as religious and only three as secular.1 68 Finally, the court examined whether the plaintiff was "engaged in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or religious." 169 The court found that this element was satisfied because the
plaintiff was designated to be a" 'ministerial presence' to ailing parishioners on occasion," and because she organized "music [which]
constitute[d] a form of prayer" for the congregation. 170 Although the
Starkman court claimed to derive its test from its holding in EEOC
v. Mississippi College, the court changed the test in subtle ways by
broadening the range of considered factors and treating elements
17
that were previously determinative as optional factors. Thus, it is

164. Compare id. (requiring that the plaintiffs job duties satisfy only one of a multitude of
factors for the ministerial exception to apply), with Miss. College, 626 F.2d at 485, and EEOC v.
Pac. Press Pubrg Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the plaintiffs did not
fall within the ministerial exception, because they "[were] not intermediaries between a church
and its congregation" and did not "attend to the religious needs of the faithful7 or "instruct students in the whole of religious doctrine").
165. Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176.
166. Id. Arguably, this factor could be applied, with the same result, to teachers at religious
schools who incorporate Bible lessons into their curriculum, even though courts consistently
exclude teachers in religious schools from application of the ministerial exception. See, e.g., Miss.
College, 626 F.2d at 485 (denying application of the ministerial exception to the faculty of a religiously-operated university); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 42 F. Supp. 2d 849, 853
(S.D. Ind. 1998) (holding that the ministerial exception did not apply to preclude an ADA claim
by a teacher in a church-operated elementary school).
167. Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176. But cf. Shirkey v. Eastwind Cmty. Dov. Corp., 941 F. Supp.
567, 577 (D. Md. 1996) (denying application of the ministerial exception to a minister's race
discrimination claim because, although the minister was clearly authorized to perform ecclesiastical functions, the position for which he applied was a lay position), modified, 993 F. Supp. 370
(D. Md. 1998), offd, No. 99-1841, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32387 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 1999).
168. Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176. The church produced documentation of this belief by citing
a copy of its "1994 Ministry of Excellence in Music." Id.
169. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284
(5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)).
170. Id. at 176-77.
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clear that the "primary duties of the plaintiff' test, which conditions application solely on the nature of the plaintiffs employment
relationship with the church, can be manipulated in subtle ways to
broaden the scope of church actors covered by the exception.
Adopting a rationale similar to that of the Starkman court, a
Michigan appellate court also concluded a church organist could be
considered "clergy" for purposes of the ministerial exception in Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit.172 In Assemany, the church defendant argued that the ministerial exception should apply to its decision not to renew the plaintiffs job contract because his job involved more than simply playing the organ in church; rather,, his
position required pastoral-liturgical leadership. 173 The Assemany
court accepted the church's ministerial clause argument, finding
that the "[p]laintiff was intimately involved in the propagation of
Catholic doctrine and the observance and conduct of Catholic liturgy." 174 Because the plaintiffs job required a working knowledge of
Catholic doctrine and liturgy and involved the selection and teaching of liturgical music as well as leading the congregation in song,
the court held that the plaintiffs duties were sufficiently religious
for him to be considered "important to the spiritual and pastoral
mission of the church." 175 Citing the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, the Assemany court characterized the test for classification as a minister
to be whether "the employee's primary duties consist of teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious

171. Whereas the Fifth Circuit in Mississippi College examined whether the plaintiff tended
to the religious needs of the faithful or instructed in the whole of religious doctrine, the Starkman court considered whether the plaintiff engaged in traditionally religious activities, including
but not limited to whether the plaintiff attended to the religious needs of the faithful. Compare
Miss. College, 626 F.2d at 485 (remarking that "[plaintiffs] neither attend to the religious needs
of the faithful nor instruct students in the whole of religious doctrine"), with Starkman, 198 F.3d
at 176 (noting that the third and "probably most important" factor is whether plaintiff "engaged
in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or religious," including whether plaintiff "attends to the religious needs of the faithful") (emphasis added and internal citations omitted)). See
also EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a female
music minister's sex discrimination claim against her church employer was barred by the constitutional ministerial exception because applying the "function of the position" test to the plaintiff
placed her within the ambit of ministerial exception because of her role in "the selection, presentation, and teaching of music, which is an integral part of Catholic worship and belief').
172. Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that a church organist's employment discrimination claim against a church was barred from
adjudication by the constitutional ministerial exception).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 237-38 (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)).
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order, or supervision of participation in religious ritual and worship. 176 By satisfying one of these factors, a religious group could
have the employment position at issue classified as "ministerial"
and avoid the application of federal employment discrimination
laws to the church's relationship with the employee.
As the church musician cases illustrate, application of the
"primary duties of the plaintiff' test has created an increasingly
broad area of protection for church employment decisions regardless of the reason for the church's employment decision or the nature of the alleged discrimination. Given the underlying rationale of
the ministerial exception, as well as long-standing deference to
churches in selecting its religious leaders, such broad application of
the ministerial exception may not be problematic as applied to hiring decisions involving only the church and potential or former employees. Deference to the church becomes less comfortable, however,
when an unlawful church employment decision lacks any rational
grounding in religious doctrine, or when a church employment decision results in harm to a third party. Indeed, when a religious organization asserts the ministerial exception in a Title VII hostile
environment sexual harassment case, the inherent shortcomings of
applying only the "primary duties of the plaintiff' test to determine
application of the ministerial exception are evident.
V. A RELIGIOUS RIGHT TO PROTECTION FROM HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND NEGLIGENT
HIRING AND SUPERVISION CLAIMS UNDER THE MINISTERIAL
EXCEPTION?
Once courts determined which types of employees would be
included within the scope of the constitutional ministerial exception,' 77 the question of which types of claims would be exempted
from adjudication remained. The statutory religious institution exemption in Section 702 of Title VII indicates only that Congress intended
to
exempt
churches
from
claims
of religious
discrimination. 178 Thus, only lower court opinions have provided for
guidance as to which claims should be covered by the judicially cre-

176. Id.
177. See supraPartIV.A.
178. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994)).
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ated constitutional ministerial exception. 17 9 One especially controversial claim for application of the ministerial exception has been
hostile to environment sexual harassment under Title VII.
As indicated in the first case articulating a constitutional
ministerial exception, McClure v. Salvation Army, the ministerial
exception may apply to sex discrimination claims. 180 Under Title
VII, hostile environment sexual harassment is an actionable form of
sex discrimination.'18 By implication, it seems that the constitutional ministerial exception would apply to such claims. Hostile environment sexual harassment claims differ from other Title VII
claims, however, in two ways: (1) hostile environment sexual harassment claims by non-ministerial plaintiffs may still implicate a
ministerial relationship if the allegation is that a church defendant
failed to take appropriate employment action in response to complaints of harassment by a minister, and (2) hostile environment
sexual harassment claims involve harm to an innocent third party
outside the ambit of the church/minister relationship. Applying the
traditional primary duties of the plaintiff analysis to determine application of the ministerial exception to such claims would be both
overinclusive and underinclusive. It would be overinclusive because, unlike other forms of discrimination where the church's
ability to hire clergy of its choice is directly assailed, a hostile environment sexual harassment claim only indirectly involves church
hiring practices. It would be underinclusive because limiting the
exception's application to claims by ministerial employees would
overlook the fact that claims by non-ministerial employees may
nonetheless implicate a church/minister relationship to some extent. Thus, the issue of whether the ministerial exception should
apply to hostile environment sexual harassment claims is especially
complicated. Moreover, if the ministerial exception does apply to
hostile environment sexual harassment claims, perhaps by the
same token it should also apply to state law-based negligent hiring
and supervision claims, in which plaintiffs similarly attack
churches' failure to take employment action against ministers who
engaged in sexual abuse or other misconduct. The following two

179. The Supreme Court has never determined whether the constitutional ministerial excep-

tion is required or prohibited by the Constitution; the exception was wholly created by lower
federal courts.
180. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-61 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying the constitutional ministerial exception to a sex discrimination claim brought by an ordained minister for the
Salvation Army).

181. The prohibition on hostile environment sexual harassment is drawn from Title VI's
proscription of sex discrimination in Section 703(a)(1). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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Sections address these issues and the differing approaches adopted
by courts that have considered them.
A. The Non-MinisterialEmployee as Plaintiff
Although the traditional ministerial exception test articulated by various circuit courts focuses primarily on the duties of the
plaintiff in determining whether the exception applies, sexual harassment cases brought by non-ministerial employees against the
church pose unique issues when the claim calls into question the
church's employment of a minister who allegedly harassed or
abused parishioners or employees. Such issues may not be readily
apparent if workplace sexual harassment cases are analyzed in the
same way that other types of sex discrimination cases are
analyzed. 8 2 As stated by one federal district court, "[s]imply assessing the role of the plaintiffs vis-h-vis the defendants and the
Church in this case would lead the court to conclude that the
church-minister exception does not apply because plaintiffs are not
ministers, and they do not primarily serve the spiritual or pastoral
18 3
mission of the Church."
In addition, merely applying the "primary duties of the
plaintiff' test to a non-religious employee's hostile environment
sexual harassment claim against a church to determine the ministerial exception's applicability would overlook the underlying rationale of the exception: protecting the church from state involvement in decisions regarding the hiring, retention, and termination
of clergy. If, according to the courts that created the ministerial exception, "[t[he relationship between an organized church and its
ministers is its lifeblood" and "[m]atters touching this relationship
must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical

182. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the Supreme Court, in accord with EEOC
guidelines, held that sexual harassment was a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). Although there are two types of sexual harassment prohibited by Title VII, hostile environment sexual harassment is the only type
that is pertinent to the ministerial exception cases because only this type of harassment claim
potentially implicates the churchlminister employment relationship. The typical fact pattern for
such a claim involves a plaintiff who has allegedly been harassed by a priest and seeks to recover
damages from the church for its failure to take action to avoid or eliminate the hostile or abusive
work environment created by the priest's sexual harassment. See, e.g., Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of
the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 696-99 (E.D.N.C. 1999)
(describing such allegations as underlying plaintiffs Title VII claim against the church conference).
183. United Methodist, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
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concern," 184 it follows that any employment decision regarding

clergy must be treated differently than other employment decisions.
This is because the Supreme Court has recognized that "the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before
the secular courts as conclusive."' 8 5 According to this principle,
church decisions regarding the employment of clergy members
should not be adjudicated in secular courts, regardless of whether
the dispute involves their hiring, retention, or termination.
Thus, if the overarching rationale for the ministerial exception is to provide special protection from state intervention for all
"matters touching [the church/minister] relationship,"'186 allowing
lay employees to pursue claims against churches for hostile environment sexual harassment seems antithetical. By alleging that the
church is liable for such a claim, the plaintiff asserts that the
church as employer harmed the plaintiff by failing to take adequate
action to prevent a hostile and abusive work environment from developing. 8 7 If a plaintiff alleges that a church failed to take adequate action to prevent or stop a minister from creating a sexually
abusive or hostile environment, the plaintiff is, in fact, accusing the
church of failing to discipline or terminate a particular clergy member. Resolving such a dispute goes against the principle of freedom
from state interference in matters concerning the church/minister
relationship, which inheres in the ministerial exception as originally defined. 188 Thus, although the "primary duties of the plaintiff' test would not require application of the ministerial exception
184. McClure,460 F.2d at 558-59.
185. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 7 (1929) (holding that courts could
not adjudicate an attempted challenge to an archbishop's decision regarding a chaplaincy appointment).
186. McClure,460 F.2d at 559.
187. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998) ("An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct [by
the plaintiffs co-worker] but failed to stop it."); see also United Methodist, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 710
('Plaintiffs claim that [the employers] violated Title VII because they knew or should have
known about the sexually harassing environment to which plaintiffs were subjected.., and that
defendants failed to take action to protect plaintiffs."). If the harassing employee is the plain.
tiffs supervisor, the employer may be vicariously liable for the harassment unless (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S.
at 745-46 (explaining that agency principles are applied to establish supervisory authority in
sexual harassment claims, as well as the affirmative defenses an employer can assert in response); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998) (setting forth the test for
employer liability for a supervisor's acts of sexual harassment).
188. McClure, 460 F.2d at 559.
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when the plaintiff is not a ministerial employee, adjudication of a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim against a religious
organization may nevertheless contradict the underlying rationale
of the ministerial exception when the dispute implicates the supervisory relationship between a church and its minister.
Both federal and state courts have grappled with the question of whether negligence-based actions against a church can properly be adjudicated under the First Amendment when the plaintiff
challenges the hiring, supervision, or retention of a clergy member
who allegedly sexually harassed or abused the plaintiff. This problem arises in two contexts, depending on the type of claim alleged
by the plaintiff. The first instance is in the case of Title VII hostile

environment sexual harassment claims against a religious organization, which are generally addressed in federal court under federal
subject matter jurisdiction.18 9 First Amendment issues also arise in
state law negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention claims
against churches, generally heard by state courts.19 0 The latter type
of cases involve application of state law rather than Title VII; the
analysis is based on the First Amendment's Religion Clauses rather
than the ministerial exception, because the ministerial exception
has been applied only to Title VII and other federal employment
discrimination claims. 191 Because, as applied to church defendants,
both hostile environment sexual harassment and negligent hiring
and supervision claims may result in church liability for failing to
make certain employment decisions in response to allegations of
clergy misconduct, 192 these cases can be analyzed together to de-

189. See supra note 187 for theories of employer liability in hostile environment sexual harassment claims.
190. See Joseph B. Conder, Annotation, Liability of Church or Religious Society for Seual
Misconduct of Clergy, 5 AI I. 5th 530, 535 (1993) (noting that liability has been asserted
against churches and religious societies for the sexual misconduct of their clergy under theories
of imputed negligence, including respondeat superior and agency, as well as under direct negligence for negligent supervision and hiring). Because most courts have rejected imputed negligence claims based on a narrow definition of the scope of ministerial employment, see, eg., Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 286-87 (Col.1988) (concluding that an imputed negligence action
could not stand because given that "sexual intercourse with a parishioner... is not part of the
priests duties nor customary within the business of the church), this Note focuses on the direct
negligence claims for negligent supervision and hiring that have been more widely disputed in
the state courts.
191. Drawing directly from the Religion Clauses instead of the ministerial exception only
changes the analysis slightly because the ministerial exception is itself founded on the Religion
Clauses. The primary difference between analyzing First Amendment defenses in state law and
federal law claims is that the ministerial exception "shorthand" for a First Amendment violation
is not available in state law claims because the ministerial exception is a federal law doctrine.
192. Compare BurlingtonIndus., 524 U.S. at 742 (An employer is negligent with respect to
sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the [co-worker's] conduct and failed to
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termine whether the underlying reasoning of the ministerial exception should apply to such claims. 193 The issue that arises in both
sexual harassment and state law-based negligence claims is

whether First Amendment principles, including the church's right
to employ religious leaders free of governmental interference and
the state's interest in avoiding excessive entanglement of church
and state, should override a plaintiffs interest in redressing a
church's failure to protect the plaintiff from harm, recognized yet

ignored, by the church.
1. The Nature of the Controversy Analysis: No First Amendment
Protection for Religious Organizations from Sexual Harassment
Claims by Non-Ministerial Employees
Although there are few cases involving sexual harassment

claims by non-ministerial employees against religious organizations, 194 courts hearing such cases have, for the most part, held that
the First Amendment does not prohibit adjudication when the dispute implicates the church/minister relationship. 195 In rejecting

stop it."), with Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997) CNegligent supervision implicates the duty of a master to control conduct of a servant: A master is under the duty to exercise
reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to
prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them if... the master... knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
317 (1965)), and Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287 (Colo. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff
stated a viable claim against a church diocese for negligent supervision since "[t]he principal
may be negligent because he has reason to know that the servant or other agent, because of his
qualities, is likely to harm others in view of the work or instrumentalities entrusted to him"
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965)).

193. Because both hostile environment sexual harassment claims under Title VII and negli.
gent hiring, supervision, and retention claims under state law are based on an employer's failure
to take action to prevent harm caused by its agent or employee despite evidence of the agent's
proclivity to harm the plaintiff, both types of claims challenge a church employment decision to
retain the minister/employee on a negligence-based theory. See supra note 192. Thus, the issue
of whether a court may adjudicate such a challenge to a church employment decision involving
clergy is similar in both types of claims.
194. Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist, 63 F. Supp. 2d
694, 711 (E.D.N.C. 1999) ("The number of published and on-line decisions in which courts have
addressed sexual harassment claims against religious institutions is extremely limited, and most
of those that are available involve claims made by ministers.").
195. See, e.g., id. at 715 (concluding that "this court cannot agree that courts are required to
defer to religious authority in resolving sexual harassment claims where no issue of doctrinal
controversy is involved and where the dispute between the parties is not ecclesiastical"); Nigrolli
v. Catholic Bishop, 1991 WL 36712, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1991) (rejecting the defendant's First
Amendment defense to a Title VII claim by a Catholic school principal and noting that "[thero is
...no doubt that in order to determine if the plaintiff was sexually harassed, the court need not
inquire into the doctrines and religious goals of the Catholic Church nor of the school").
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Free Exercise and Establishment Clause defenses to the application
of Title VII harassment provisions, courts have relied on two basic
principles: (1) the defendant religious organization has no argument based in religious doctrine for condoning sexual harassment,
and (2) reviewing a church's response to complaints of sexual harassment would involve application of neutral principles of law
without intruding upon church autonomy. 19
In Smith v. Raleigh District of the North Carolina Conference
of the United Methodist, a North Carolina federal district court addressed the issue of whether the ministerial exception should be
applied to two church administrative employees' Title VII hostile
environment sexual harassment claims against the Methodist Conference. The court ultimately concluded that adjudicating the
claims would not violate the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. 197
In making this determination, however, the court acknowledged
that the hybrid nature of this case required that the court engage in
a more detailed analysis than mere application of the "primary duties of the plaintiff' test would provide; although the plaintiffs were
not ministers, their claims arose from a minister's misconduct. 193
Because the plaintiffs hostile environment sexual harassment
claim would necessarily touch on the church/minister
relationship 9 9 and require inquiry into the church's supervision

196. United Methodist, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
The court need not dwell on the issues of faith and doctrine because defendants
have not alleged a particular religious belief or doctrine that would be compromised by this court's exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiffs' hostile environment
[sexual harassment] claims. Defendants certainly have not suggested that the
Methodist Church condones sexual harassment in any way ....
Id.; see also id. at 713 ("Even assuming this court must review the actions taken by defendants ... in response to plaintiffs' formal grievances ... such a review would not require an
intrusion upon church autonomy and governance of the type or magnitude at issue in [the cases
underlying the ministerial exception]."). Similar to other courts, the United Methodist court
narrowly interpreted the question of whether the church had a doctrinal basis for its employment decision by classifying the doctrinal issue as whether the church defendant condoned sexual harassment. Id. The outcome of the courts inquiry would have changed if the issue were
defined more broadly to include reasons the church might have had for retaining a minister
accused of sexual harassment. By requiring a religious organization to have professed a belief in
condoning sexual harassment, the court failed to give the church a realistic chance to articulate a
doctrinal reason for retaining the minister, such as forgiveness and rehabilitation rather than
mandatory termination. See infra note 215 for further discussion of how the definition of
"church doctrine" may be significant to the ministerial exception analysis.
197. Id. at 714, 719.
198. Id. at 706. Such heightened analysis was appropriate, according to the court, because
the case not only implicated the plaintiffs non-religious employment relationship with the
church, but also "the court's ability to subject to judicial scrutiny at least some small aspect of
the church-minister relationship." Id.
199. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972).
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and discipline of its clergy, the church argued that the ministerial
exception should be applied in this hybrid situation. 200
Without detailed analysis of the defendant's claim that the
ministerial exception should apply to cases indirectly implicating
the church/minister relationship, the United Methodist court simply
stated that the defendant's argument was more properly analyzed
based upon general Free Exercise and Establishment Clause principles rather than by per se application of the ministerial
exception. 20 ' The court did not give a specific reason for its rejection
of the ministerial exception. 202 Rather, it merely concluded that "the
[church's] defense is more properly based upon the church autonomy principle articulated in the Supreme Court decisions upon
which the church-minister exception was based. ' 20 3 The United

Methodist court first examined Free Exercise/church autonomy arguments for excluding churches from sexual harassment and sexual
misconduct cases.2 04 Drawing from church autonomy principles, 205
the United Methodist court asserted that whether a church's employment decision should be subjected to court scrutiny depends on
the degree to which "resolving the issues raised by a plaintiffs
claims would require intrusion into the spiritual functions of the
religious institution at issue." 20 6 The court concluded that in a case
involving hostile environment sexual harassment, it would not have
to intrude upon the spiritual functions of the church because the
court's inquiry would be limited to whether the church's actions
were based in religious doctrine and whether the church knew
about the harassment and failed to take action. 207 Without a religion-based reason for failing to respond to the alleged harassment,
the court could resolve the claims "in secular terms-the terms of
negligence law and sexual harassment." 208 Therefore, adjudication

200. UnitedMethodist, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 706-07.
201. Id. at 707.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. This Note uses the term "sexual misconduct" to refer to illegal and involuntary sexual
acts committed against other individuals, including sexual abuse and assault against adults and
children, as well as the initiation or coercion of improper sexual relations.
205. Id. at 709 (stating that churches should be able to "decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine") (citing Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
206. Id. (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171
(4th Cir. 1985)).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 715.
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of the claim would not implicate Free Exercise and church autonomy principles.
For reasons analogous to its rejection of the defendant's Free
Exercise Clause argument, the United Methodist court also rejected
the defendant's Establishment Clause argument. 2 9 Because Title
VII's proscription of hostile environment sexual harassment clearly
had a secular purpose and did not primarily advance religion, the
only contentious factor of the Lemon test was whether the statutory
requirements excessively entangled church and state. 210 Because
the court would not have to "choose between competing religious
visions," and because the resultant church/state relationship would
be procedurally and substantively limited, the United Methodist
court held that applying Title VII sexual harassment provisions to
the United Methodist Conference would not violate the Establishment Clause. 211 Thus, the court's Establishment Clause holding was
similar to its Free Exercise Clause holding: both emphasized that
neither the church's reason for its employment determination nor
the investigative and adjudicative process would implicate religious
12
doctrine.

209. Id. at 719.
210. Id. at 716-17 (applying Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)). In analyzing

the entanglement prong, the United Methodist court adopted the case-sensitive approach taken
by the D.C. Circuit in Catholic University rather than the statute-centered approach of the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits, and held that an Establishment Clause issue only arises when the court
must address a question of religious doctrine or practice. United Methodist, 63 F. Supp. 2d at
717 (citing EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
211. Id. at 719. In holding that the Establishment Clause would not be violated by adjudicating the plaintiffs claim, the court emphasized that spiritual beliefs were not at issue in this
case. Id. at 717 ClVhile a court's intrusion upon a church's selection of a minister may be viewed
as an establishment clause violation when a court effectively mandates the selection or forbids
the discharge of a certain minister, the same cannot be said of the government's enforcement of
its sexual harassment laws, a process in which core religious beliefs are not at issue."). The court
overstates the absence of an Establishment Clause issue in applying sexual harassment laws to
churches, however, by implying that such claims never result in such a problem. See id. One
could imagine, however, a situation in which a church defends retaining a minister accused of
sexual harassment on the grounds that the minister should be rehabilitated and forgiven, rather
than terminated. See Pritrlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 789 (Wis. 1995)
CBeliefs in penance, admonition, and reconciliation as a sacramental response to sin may be the
point of attack by a challenger who wants a court to probe the tort-law reasonableness of the
church's mercy toward the offender...."); infra note 215. Hostile environment sexual harassment liability may be interpreted as an ex post facto statement to the church that it should have
discharged or removed the offending minister from his position. Although such a statement may
not rise to the level of a hiring mandate, see United Methodist, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 717, such a
scenario casts doubt on the United Methodist court's assertion that adjudicating sexual harassment cases can never result in Establishment Clause violations.
212. The similarity between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause analyses in sexual
harassment cases is further illustrated by courts' discussions of church defendants' First
Amendment defenses in state law negligent hiring and supervision cases, which generally ad-
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Similarly, when third party plaintiffs have asserted state
law negligent hiring, supervision, or retention claims, many courts
have held the First Amendment poses no problem because, absent a
doctrinal reason for the church's employment decision, the court is
not required to weigh or interpret religious beliefs. 213 Rather, the
dispute may be resolved by applying a secular standard to secular
conduct. 214 Indeed, absent a religious tenet that would be undermined by the application of sexual harassment or misconduct
laws, 215 religious organizations do not have a logical argument for
dress the two arguments together and base both holdings on the absence of a doctrinal dispute.
See, e.g., Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80-81 (D.R.I. 1997) (holding that the adjudication
of a plaintiffs negligent supervision claim did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the
claim could be resolved by applying neutral and generally applicable principles of law, and there
was no Establishment Clause problem because the claim did not require interpretation of relig.
ious doctrine); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 930-31 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (addressing a
church's First Amendment defenses as one issue and concluding that no constitutional violation
existed because the defendants did not assert a religious tenet that would be violated by adjudicating the plaintiffs negligent hiring claim); Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395, 397 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1998) (resolving the First Amendment defenses asserted by the defendant by concluding
that without religious tenets at issue, the court is not required to weigh or interpret church doc.
trine). Courts' holdings in negligent hiring and supervision claims against church defendants
suggest that both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause issues can be resolved by determining
whether the church has a religious reason for its employment or disciplinary decisions regarding
its clergy or whether adjudicating the claim would otherwise require the court to examine religious tenets.
213. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 321 (Colo. 1993) (concluding that
because the specific facts presented by the plaintiffs case did not require interpreting or weighing church doctrine, the First Amendment was not a defense to adjudication of the claim); Doe v.
Malicki, No. 3D99-549, 2000 WL 1022042, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Cf. App. Dec. 7, 2000) (holding that,
because determining whether the church defendant knew one of its priests sexually assaulted
the plaintiffs but failed to take action was an issue governed by tort law which would not require
inquiry into religious doctrines and practices, the First Amendment did not bar adjudication of
the claim); Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (reversing the trial courts grant of summary judgment to
the defendant, because the plaintiffs negligent retention and supervision claims arising out of a
minister's sexual misconduct involved "conduct that the Church Defendants do not claim is part
of the tenets or practices of the Methodist Church," and consequently the court did not need to
"interpret or weigh church doctrine in its adjudication of the Plaintiffs claim").
214. See, e.g., Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1323-24 (Colo. 1997)
(holding that a negligent hiring and supervision claim against a church, arising from alleged
sexual abuse of a child by a minister, "is actionable because it does not require such interpretation or weighing of religious belief but instead is merely application of a secular standard to
secular conduce'); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 455 (Ind.Ct. App. 1996) (noting that "several courts have determined that when purely secular conduct is at issue, courts can apply secular standards and hold churches responsible for the effects of their conduct on third parties" and
holding that the First Amendment would not be violated by adjudicating the plaintiffs negligent
supervision claim because, given that the offending minister's actions were not religiously motivated, review of the plaintiffs claim did not require inquiry into religious doctrine or practice).
215. Although it is difficult to imagine a religious doctrine that would support a church's decision not to act after having received complaints of sexual harassment by one of its ministers,
churches might defend a decision not to terminate a minister accused of sexual harassment by
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Free Exercise protection. 216 Courts have also distinguished between
disputes of an internal and an external nature to determine
whether church autonomy principles should preclude application of
negligent hiring or supervision laws. 217 Thus, another reason for
rejecting a Free Exercise or church autonomy defense is that, unlike disputes between religious factions or between a church and its
ministers, negligent hiring cases involve harm to a third
party.
Such a dispute, courts have argued, "can hardly be characterized as
a dispute involving an internal church matter."2 18 Similar to federal
courts hearing hostile environment sexual harassment claims,
many state courts have found no Free Exercise problem in applying
negligent hiring and supervision laws to religious organizations.

references to church beliefs in forgiveness and rehabilitation of ministers, rather than immediately terminating ministers for alleged wrongdoings. One problem religious organizations might
face in articulating such a defense, however, is reluctance on behalf of courts to accept the validity of supposed religious tenets that are not reflected in official church doctrine. Professor
Douglas Laycock illustrates this Free Exercise problem for religious organizations, noting that
when religious organizations assert Free Exercise protection from state regulation, "courts have
tried to decide whether activities of organized churches were required by church doctrine which
at best represents the dominant or most commonly held view" and "cannot safely be imputed to
every believer or every affiliated congregation.: Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of
the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to ChurchAutonomy, 81
COLUmL I REv. 1373, 1390-91 (1981) (emphasis added). Professor Laycock argues that "[t]his
gap between official doctrine and rank-and-file belief means that courts are prone to err in deciding whether activities of a local church or small group of believers are compelled by conscience." Id. at 1391. Because of this "gap" between officially promulgated church doctrine of
organized religious organizations and the beliefs of the local congregation leadership, church
defendants in hostile environment sexual harassment cases may have trouble convincing a court
that their failure to remove a minister accused of harassment was because of their religious
beliefs. Id. at 1390-91.
216. See, e.g., Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 73 (D. Conn. 1995)
(asserting that "to have protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious
belief'); Jones, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 931 ("[Inasmuch as it is conduct, and not creed, that underlies
plaintiffs' actions, and that the potential for civil consequences exists equally as to religious and
non-religious persons, and as to clergy and lay persons of all religions alike, the Free Exercise
aspect of the First Amendment does not come into play to preclude plaintiffs' [negligent hiring
claim].") (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
217. See, e.g., Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D.R.I. 1997) (distinguishing the plaintiffs negligent supervision claim arising from a priests alleged sexual abuse of minors from
internal church disputes requiring non-intervention, because the plaintiffs claim involved
church officials and third persons rather than factions within the church or the church/minister
relationship); Bear Valley Church of Christ, 928 P.2d at 1323 (noting that although the court
previously held that "[t]he decision to hire or discharge a minister is itself inextricable from
religious doctrine ...we took care to distinguish internal hiring disputes within religious organizations from general negligence claims filed by injured third parties"); Mrozha v. Archdiocese of
St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 811 (Minn. Ct App. 1992) (distinguishing the plaintiffs action against a diocese arising from the alleged sexual abuse of a child by a pastor from
church autonomy cases involving internal church property disputes on the basis that "this case
concerns conduct by the Church that resulted in external and secular harm").
218. Smith, 986 F. Supp. at 77.
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Although the state's intrusion on the church/minister relationship may be more tenuous in the sexual harassment and negligent hiring and supervision cases than in the traditional sex discrimination cases, the more attenuated connection does not adequately explain why the ministerial exception is applied in the latter but not the former group.219 Such a cavalier rejection of the
ministerial exception in sexual harassment and misconduct cases
yields three propositions: (1) courts are well-equipped to evaluate
and respond to a church's Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
defense to state intervention without blindly invoking the ministerial exception; (2) there are certain church employment decisions
that courts will scrutinize for a religious motive, without which the
plaintiffs claim will not be barred; and (3) although courts may be
willing to sacrifice the rights of religious employees to be free from
unlawful discrimination, they will not defer to churches when sexual misconduct or third-party harm is at issue.
2. The Nature of the Church/Minister Relationship Analysis: All
Church Employment Decisions Implicating Clergy Should Be
Protected
Employing the same factors as courts rejecting First
Amendment protection for churches in hostile environment sexual
harassment and negligent hiring and supervision claims, other
courts have reached opposite results.2 20 These courts reason that all
hiring, firing, and disciplinary decisions regarding clergy must receive First Amendment protection because of the nature of the

219. The UnitedMethodist court distinguished the case at bar from other cases in which non.
religious employees brought Title Vfl claims against religious organizations, noting that unlike
sexual discrimination cases brought by non-religious employees, "the issues in this [hostile onvi.
ronment sexual harassment] case may involve not only the relationship between defendants and
these secular employees of the church (the plaintiffs), but also, to a lesser extent, the defendants'
relationship with the minister that they assigned to that Church." Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the
N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (em-

phasis added). Thus, the court acknowledged that adjudication of plaintiffs' sexual harassment
case against the church would implicate the church/minister relationship to some extent, Id. The
court did not, however, explain why this implication should not result in application of the ministerial exception or, more importantly, to what extent adjudication would have to implicate a
church/minister relationship in order for the ministerial exception to apply.
220. For lists of cases illustrating the split of authority among courts regarding the First
Amendment implications of adjudicating negligent hiring and supervision claims against
churches, see Doe v. Malicki, No. 3D99-549, 2000 WL 1022042, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 26,
2000); N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 602 n.47 (Okla. 1999).
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church/minister relationship. 22 ' They assert that regardless of the
employer's action or motivation, adjudicating claims implicating
clergy hiring decisions requires courts to compare what a "reasonable employer" would do with what the church defendant did-a
"proscribed comparison," according to one court. 2
Courts holding that the adjudication of negligent hiring and
supervision claims against church employers necessarily violates
the First Amendment emphasize that in all decisions regarding
hiring, firing, or discipline, the church's determination is necessarily guided by religious doctrine and practice. 223 These courts reason
that, regardless of whether or not a religious institution has a doctrinal reason for the challenged employment decision, examining
church employment policies regarding ministerial employment to
determine what is "reasonable" conduct necessitates "inappropriate
governmental involvement" in violation of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses.2 2 Based on this rationale, a Florida appellate court held in Doe v. Evans that a parishioner's negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention claim against her former church for
failing to respond to her allegations of sexual misconduct by one of
the church's ministers was barred from adjudication by the First

221. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (asserting that"[any
award of damages [fPr a negligent supervision claim against a church] would have a chilling
effect leading indirectly to state control over the future conduct of affairs of a religious denomination"); Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1131 (Colo. 1996) (asserting in the context of a Title
VII sexual harassment case that "[a]pplying Title VII or any anti-discrimination law to a
church's choice of a minister would require a judge to question the belief system of the church, to
validate certain interpretations of the religious doctrine over others, or to compel the church to
accept certain ideas into their belief system"); Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) ([A] courts determination regarding whether the church defendant was 'reasonable'
would necessarily entangle the court in issues of the church's religious law, practices and policies."), review granted, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1999); H.R.B. v. J.LG., 913 S.W.2d 92, 98-99 (o.
Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to recognize a breach of fiduciary duty action against a church and one
of its priests for the priests alleged sexual abuse of the plaintiff as a child because the plaintiff
could recover under other legal theories, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
because adjudicating the plaintiffs claim would inevitably require inquiry into the religious
aspects of the church's relationship with its priests and parishioners).
222. Evans, 718 So. 2d at 291.
223. See, e.g., id.
224. See, e.g., Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1250-51 (D. Colo. 1998), affd, 185 F.3d
873 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that adjudicating the plaintiffs negligent supervision claim stemming from alleged sexual abuse by a priest was barred by the First Amendment because courts
are not equipped or constitutionally permitted to define reasonable conduct for a church employer); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 441, 445 (Me. 1997) (ex-pressing concern
that "[t]he imposition of secular duties and liability on the church as a 'principal' vdll infringe
upon its right to determine the standards governing the relationship between the church, its
bishop, and the parish priest"); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.V.2d 239, 247 (lo. 1997) (asserting that
"judicial inquiry into hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy would result in an endorsement of
religion, by approving one model for church hiring, ordination, and retention of clergy).
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Amendment. 25 In so holding, the court presumed that a church's
hiring, supervision, and termination decisions with respect to a
minister are necessarily guided by religious doctrine and
practice.2 26 Drawing from the Establishment Clause's antientanglement principle, the court determined that evaluating the
church defendant's decision not to terminate the offending minister
would be unconstitutional.2 27 Courts adopting the position articulated in Evans, unlike courts that determine the constitutionality of
adjudicating claims implicating a ministerial relationship on a case
by case basis, focus on the nature of the church/minister relationship and assume that all church employment decisions regarding
clergy necessarily involve questions of religious doctrine or practice
and are therefore per se excluded from adjudication.
Courts that find a per se violation of the First Amendment
when a claim involves examining a ministerial relationship and
courts that determine that a non-ministerial plaintiffs claim can
never result in a First Amendment problem both rely excessively on
presumptions about church doctrine and practice. Whereas the position rejecting all First Amendment defenses assumes that a
church will never have a religious reason for continuing to employ a
minister accused of sexual harassment or misconduct, the position
universally accepting the First Amendment as a defense assumes
that all employment decisions regarding clergy are necessarily
based in religious doctrine. These analyses are both overly simplistic and fail to take into account the specific facts of each individual
case.
Cases involving non-ministerial employees as plaintiffs illustrate, however, that claims implicating the church/minister relationship need not be resolved through blind application of the ministerial exception in order to address potential First Amendment
issues. Rather, it is possible to address these issues by applying
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause analyses to each individual case. Such a case-specific analysis allows a court to determine
whether the First Amendment is logically implicated by examining
whether a religious belief or practice would have to be addressed or

225. Evans, 718 So. 2d at 290-91. The court acknowledged that other courts have held that
the First Amendment bars adjudication of claims like the plaintiffs. Id.
226. Id. at 291.

227. Id. at 290-91. The court espoused the proposition, taken from Lemon, that government
may not excessively entangle itself with religion and asserted that excessive entanglement occurs when "courts begin to review and interpret a church's constitution, laws, and regulations."
Id. at 288; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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decided by the court. This determination should be the deciding factor, and courts should not assume that churches would have no religious reason for their employment decisions in cases involving
sexual harassment or misconduct by priests; nor should courts assume every employment decision involving clergy necessarily implicates religious doctrine.
Rather, the method of analysis that achieves the optimum
balance between churches' rights to self-governance and plaintiffs'
rights to redress for unlawful discrimination having no relation to a
church's spiritual mission would first require religious employers to
articulate a doctrinal basis for taking the particular employment
action at issue. If the church could articulate a religious reason for
its employment decision, this would be an affirmative defense to
adjudication of the claim. Such a requirement forces religious organizations to articulate a specific religious belief necessitating
First Amendment protection without requiring courts to examine
religious doctrine once the belief or practice is articulated. This
analysis, however, becomes more complicated in cases in which the
plaintiff is not a secular employee but is a member of the clergy
who would clearly qualify as a "minister" under the "primary duties
of the plaintiff' test.2 28 The issue then becomes whether per se ex-

clusion of the claim should still be the appropriate analysis, rather
than requiring churches to articulate a religious doctrine implicated
by adjudication of the particular dispute.
B. Sexual Harassment Claims by MinisterialEmployees Against
Religious Organizations
In Bollard v. CaliforniaProvince of the Society of Jesus, the
Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the ministerial exception requires per se exclusion of all Title VII claims by clergy
against the church. 229 Because the underlying constitutional concerns addressed by the ministerial exception were not present in
this hostile environment sexual harassment case, the Bollard court
determined the ministerial exception was neither constitutionally

228. See supraPart IV.A.
229. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied,
211 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, the issue of first impression before the court was

whether the ministerial exception should be applied to Title VII hostile environment sexual
harassment actions in addition to hiring-based Title VII employment discrimination claims. For
further discussion on employer liability in hostile environment sexual harassment cases, see
supra note 187.
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required nor logically applicable. 2 0 Absent a religious reason for
the church's employment decision, applying Title VII would not affect the church's free exercise of religion, require the court to interpret religious doctrine, or result in an ongoing church/state relationship.231
In order to determine whether the First Amendment's Religion Clauses would be implicated by adjudicating the plaintiffs
claim against the church, the court analyzed the application of Title
VII to the facts of this case under both the Free Exercise and the
Establishment Clauses. 232 The plaintiff was studying to become an
ordained priest with the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits). 23 3 During the
time that the plaintiff was in seminary school, his superiors allegedly subjected him to unsolicited sexual advances, sent him pornographic material, and engaged him in inappropriate and unwelcome
sexual discussions. 2 4 The plaintiff, in a hostile environment sexual
harassment suit, alleged that he was forced to leave the seminary
before becoming a priest as a result of this conduct. 23 5 In their defense, the Jesuits did not assert a religious justification for the conduct of plaintiffs superiors and, indeed, specifically disavowed
one.

28 6

Although the district court concluded its analysis with a determination that the plaintiff was indeed a minister and thus covered by the ministerial exception, 23 7 the Ninth Circuit performed a
more searching analysis, examining whether the First Amendment
required exception from Title VII under the facts of this particular
case.2 38 Beginning with the Free Exercise Clause, the Bollard court

230. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947-50 (holding that application of Title VII to the Society of Jesus

would not violate either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment).
231. See Id.
232. See Id.
233. See Id. at 944. This order of Roman Catholic priests is more commonly known as the
Jesuits order. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 947.
237. Id. at 944.

238. Id. at 945-50. Before launching into a constitutional analysis, the court first pointed out
that the ministerial exception is based on the Constitution rather than Title VII. Indicating its

sentiment towards per se application of the ministerial exception, the court stated, "[d]espite the
lack of a statutory basis for the ministerial exception, and despite Congress's apparent intent to
apply Title VII to religious organizations as to any other employer, courts have uniformly concluded that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment require a
narrowing construction of Title VII in order to insulate the relationship between a religious organization and its ministers from constitutionally impermissible interference by the government." Id. at 945.
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first noted that certain religious interests are "so strong that no
compelling state interest justifies government intrusion into the
ecclesiastical sphere."' 39 Such strong religious interests may arise
in cases involving competing interpretations of church doctrine or
competing claims of chaplaincy, for example. 4 ° Free Exercise concerns do not require application of the ministerial exception, however, when resolving the dispute would not require consulting religious doctrine. 24 1 Applying this dichotomy, the court reasoned that
the Free Exercise rationale for excepting the Jesuits from Title VII
was absent because the Jesuits asserted no religious justification
for the alleged harassment. 242 Essentially, the only religious defense the Jesuits could offer was that, as a future minister, the
plaintiff fit within the ministerial definition; the Jesuits could not
explain how the underlying principles of the ministerial exception
243
would be furthered in this case.
In previous cases in which church defendants asserted a
ministerial exception defense, courts did not engage in such an inquiry; rather they only examined whether the primary duties of the
plaintiff qualified him as a minister. 2 44 The Bollard court, however,
went beyond the traditional ministerial exception analysis and
adopted a test balancing church and state interests.2 5 Under this
test, a religious organization would not receive First Amendment
protection from Title VII's application "[w]here the church provides
no doctrinal nor protected-choice based rationale for its alleged ac" 6
tions, and indeed expressly disapproves of the alleged actions.
Thus, when there is no logical reason to invoke the Free Exercise
Clause, or when the church asserts no religious belief or doctrine
that would be impeded by adjudication, the Bollard court would
reject strict application of the ministerial exception in favor of a
2 47
more flexible balancing test.
The Bollard court next examined whether the Establishment
Clause nonetheless required application of the ministerial exception, concluding that the Jesuits' failure to articulate a religious

239. Id. at 946.
240. Id. (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)).
241. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947 (citing EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th
Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Pac. Press Pubrg Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982)).
242. Id. at 947.
243. Id. at 947-51.
244. See supraPart IV.A.
245. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948.

246. Id.
247. Id
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doctrine implicated by the employment dispute also precluded an
Establishment Clause defense. 248 The court determined that the
appropriate Establishment Clause test was Lemon's three-prong
test, and that the only contentious issue was the anti-entanglement
prong.2 49 The court first noted that "[e]ntanglement has both substantive and procedural dimensions." 2 0 In addition to the substantive entanglement problem caused when a church's right to select
its clergy or choose among competing opinions on religious subjects
is at stake, procedural entanglement may occur when a protracted
legal process results in an ongoing church/state relationship. 25 1 Absent a substantive entanglement problem, 25 2 however, "procedural
entanglement considerations are reduced to the constitutional propriety of subjecting a church to the expense and indignity of the
civil legal process"-considerations present whenever a church is
involved in litigation.2 58 Similar to its Free Exercise analysis, the
court balanced church and state interests in its Establishment
Clause analysis, concluding that, absent a claim directly implicating religious practice or doctrine or ministerial hiring, any procedural entanglement concerns raised by the adjudication process
were too insignificant to preclude application of Title VII. 25 4 Because neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment
Clause required the court to abstain from adjudicating Bollard's
sexual harassment case, the court held that Bollard, although
clearly a ministerial employee, could proceed on his Title VII
255
claim.

248. Id. at 948-50.

249. Id. at 948 (asserting that Title VII has an obvious secular purpose and does not principally advance or inhibit religion).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 949; see also supranote 114.
252. A substantive Establishment Clause issue could arise if the court had determined that

one of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause tests applied and resulted in a Constitutional
violation. See supraPart ll.B.1 for an overview of the various Establishment Clause tests.
253. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 949. The Bollard court also noted that, similar to the ministerial
sexual harassment case of Black v. Snyder, the plaintiff only sought monetary damages rather
than reinstatement. Id. at 947 (citing Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App.

1991)). This distinction minimized the risk of entanglement, according to both courts. Id. at
950.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 948-50.
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VI. AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS FOR THE MINISTERIAL
EXCEPTION DEFENSE DRAWING FROM BOLLARD

A. Bollard's Departurefrom the StandardMinisterialException
Analysis
Although the Bollard court cited the same cases as previous
courts applying the ministerial exception,2 6 it adopted an entirely
different approach. Rather than merely noting the underlying Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause principles of the ministerial
exception, the court actually applied these principles to the case at
bar.257 Instead of requiring the church defendant to simply con-

struct an argument that the plaintiffs position was sufficiently religious to be classified as "ministerial" under the primary duties of
the plaintiff test, the court required the church to assert a religious
reason for the church's employment decision.2 8 This requirement
departed from the traditional ministerial exception analysis, which
posited that "it would offend the Free Exercise Clause simply to
require the church to articulate a religious justification for its personnel decisions." 259 Rather than acknowledging its rejection of the
traditional ministerial exception analysis, though, the Bollard court
sought to distinguish the plaintiffs claim from other Title VII
claims asserted by ministers by arguing that this case did not in-

256. The Bollard court referred to two major lines of cases. The first was the church autonomy line of cases, in which the Supreme Court held that courts should not intervene in certain
types of disputes involving feuding church factions or that would require choosing among competing religious viewpoints. Id. at 946 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (prohibiting judicial resolution of various matters of internal church governance because "religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry ;
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 115
(1952) (holding that courts may not constitutionally adjudicate a dispute between church patriarchs regarding which patriarch would use St. Nicholas Cathedral because the issue was
"strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government")). The second line of cases to which the Bollard
court referred was the group of cases from various circuit courts formulating and applying the
ministerial exception. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946 (citing McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553,
558 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that a female minister's sex discrimination claim against the Salvation Army was barred by the ministerial exception)); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the ministerial exception barred
adjudication of a minister's sex and race discrimination claims because the Free Exercise Clause
"protects the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it"). The court distinguished these
cases from the case at bar by asserting that previous cases applying the ministerial exception
involved the selection of clergy, whereas Bollard's sexual harassment case did not Bollard, 196
F.3d atC947.
257. Id. at 947-48.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 946 (citingRayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169).
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volve clergy selection.260 The court's distinction departed from traditional ministerial exception jurisprudence, because the original understanding of the ministerial exception was that it provided a safe
haven from state regulation for all matters involving the relationship between a church and its ministers, not just ministerial
hiring.261 Thus, the Bollard court's distinction between clergy hiring
decisions and other clergy employment decisions 262 seems to be the
court's way of disguising the fact that it has really set forth a new
methodology for analyzing Title VII claims by ministers against
churches. 263
The Bollard court's analysis resulted in the correct outcome:
The Jesuits were prevented from hiding behind the ministerial exception's shield without a religious basis for the contested employment decision. 264 To ensure an equitable result in each Title VII
case, the Bollard court's analysis not only applies constitutional
defenses to Title VII claims without blind application of the ministerial exception, but also reaches a constitutionally and logically
sound result without invading the protected sphere envisioned by
the ministerial exception rationale. Although some courts justify
applying the ministerial exception to all Title VII suits by ministers
on the grounds that the employment decision in and of itself is protected, the real concern courts voice is that they refrain from evaluating the legitimacy of a religious institution's underlying reason
265
for the decision.
This Note argues that it is possible to construct a model for
evaluating ministerial exception defenses that would prevent re-

260. Id. at 946.
261. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558-59 (The relationship between an organized church and its

ministers is its lifeblood ....Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized
as of prime ecclesiastical concern."). Certainly, whether to retain or terminate a minister accused
of sexual harassment would be considered a matter "touching [the relationship between an organized church and its ministers]" that is "of prime ecclesiastical concern." Id.
262. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946.

263. The significance of the Bollard court's holding was emphasized by a four-judge dissent
to the Ninth Circuit's order denying rehearing of the case, in which the dissent argued that "the

panel opinion undermine[d] over a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence" and ran "contrary to
every other United States Court of Appeals that has had occasion to visit the issue." Bollard v.
Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 211 F.3d 1331, 1331 (2000) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
264. For examples of courts employing similar reasoning in allowing adjudication of negligent hiring and supervision claims against religious employers, see supranote 213.

265. See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173
F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e cannot conceive how the federal judiciary could determine
whether an employment decision concerning a minister was based on legitimate or illegitimate
grounds without inserting ourselves into a realm where the Constitution forbids us to tread, the
internal management of a church.").
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ligious institutions from invoking the protection of the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses absent an affected religious doctrine
or practice, without inserting the court into an evaluation of the
266
legitimacy or propriety of religion-based decisions.
B. Incorporatinga Religious DoctrineRequirement into the
MinisterialException
Drawing from Bollard, this Note's proposed ministerial exception analysis would require religious organizations to articulate
how a religious belief or practice would be implicated by judicial
resolution of the particular employment dispute at hand for the
ministerial exception to preclude adjudication of the plaintiffs traditional employment discrimination or harassment claim. Mitigating this additional requirement of an underlying issue of religious
doctrine or practice, however, this Note's proposed analysis would
expand the ministerial exception's application to more than just
ministerial plaintiffs by allowing the defense to be raised whenever
2
the plaintiffs claim directly implicates a ministerial relationship. 6

266. See infra Part VI.B. Other commentators have also criticized the primary duties of the
plaintiff ministerial analysis, because it fails to constitute an adequate proxy for measuring the
extent to which religious doctrine or practice would be implicated by adjudication of the plaintiffs claim. See, e.g., Kerri A. Gildow, Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of the United
Methodist Church: Making It Difficult to Keep the Faith When the "MinisterialException' to TYtle
VI Still Prevails,74 TUL L. REV.1567, 1577 (2000) C'Just as it is not an absolute that an investigation dealing with a secular employee would never involve church doctrine, it is likeMise not
an absolute that investigation of a minister-type employee's claim would necessarily put ecclesiastical law at issue."). This Note departs from scholarship advocating wholesale abandonment of
the ministerial exception, however, in favor of a requirement that the organization invoking the
ministerial exception articulate a doctrinal basis for its allegedly discriminatory employment
action. Contra, e.g., id. at 1577 (arguing that the statutory religious institution exemption under

Title VII should be the sole source of protection for church employment decisions because it "affords the maximum amount of protection for the individual, while still allowing churches to

choose those individuals who will undertake the church activities based on the religion of the
individual").
267. This expansion of the class of plaintiffs to which the ministerial exception may apply directly addresses the concern that the primary duties of the plaintiff analysis does not function as
an adequate proxy for whether a religious issue is implicated by the plaintiffs claim. See, e.g.,
Gildow, supranote 266, at 1577 (noting that the secular nature of an employee's job duties does
not necessarily preclude a question of religious doctrine or practice from arising during adjudication of the employee's discrimination claim). The extent to which mere application of the primary duties of the plaintiff test fails to account for all cases in which the Free Exercise dimensions of church/minister relationships are implicated is illustrated in hostile environment sexual
harassment claims and in negligent hiring and supervision claims by secular church employees
and parishioners. See, e.g., Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (noting that, although the plaintiff was a secular
employee, her hostile environment sexual harassment claim against the church defendant presented an "atypical, hybrid situation!' in that it involved not only the church's relationship with
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The test proposed by this Note has two prongs. First, the
"primary duties of the plaintiff' test, as articulated by the numerous circuit courts, would be applied to determine if the plaintiff is a
minister. 268 If the religious organization failed to prove that the
plaintiffs position within the church was sufficiently based in religious practice or teaching, the church could alternatively establish
that its relationship with a ministerial employee, as defined by the
primary duties test, would be directly implicated by adjudication of
the dispute. 269 If the religious organization proved that either the
plaintiffs current or desired employment position could be classified as "ministerial," or that the employment dispute directly implicated a ministerial relationship, the second part of the analysis
would apply; otherwise, the ministerial exception analysis would
end, and the claim would be adjudicated unless either Religion
270
Clause otherwise required judicial abstention.
Under the second prong of the test, the church defendant
would carry the burden of asserting a religious reason for its employment decision or a religious doctrine that would otherwise be
implicated if the court were to adjudicate the claim. For example, if
a female plaintiff alleged sex discrimination against a church, the
church would have to respond that it did not believe in hiring
women for the position at issue for religious reasons. Meeting this
burden would essentially constitute an affirmative defense for the
defendant, and the ministerial exception would be applied to preclude the plaintiffs case. Religious reasons for employment decisions would be construed broadly, so the court would not substan-

secular employees but also the church's relationship with the minister accused of the harass.
ment, thereby "present[ing] issues reminiscent of those in the McClure line of cases"); Doe v.
Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the First Amendment procluded adjudication of the plaintiffs negligent hiring and supervision claim because any determination of whether the church's actions with respect to a minister's employment was "reasonable" could "entangle the court in issues of the church's religious law, practices, and policies"),
review granted, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1999).
268. See supra Part IV.A for an explanation of the primary duties of the plaintiff analysis.
269. This analysis would involve application of the primary duties of the plaintiff test to any
other employee whose employment relationship with the church was implicated by the plaintiffs
claim. If the plaintiffs claim directly involved the employment relationship between the church
defendant and an employee established to be a minister under the primary duties test, the
church would proceed to the second prong for application of the ministerial exception. See supra
Part IV.A (describing the primary duties of the plaintiff test). The clearest example of a case in
which a ministerial relationship could be directly implicated is a hostile environment sexual
harassment case involving church liability for unlawful harassment by a minister, or a negligent
hiring and supervision case involving sexual misconduct by a minister.
270. In practice, many cases would reach the second prong of the analysis because of courts'
increasingly broad definitions of ministers. See supraPart IV.
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tially assert itself into a determination of which types of beliefs or
practices could constitute a doctrinal motivation for the employment action at issue. 27' If the employer had no doctrinal reason for
exclusion from regulation, however, the court would then engage in
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause analyses to determine
whether, absent a defense based on religious doctrine or practice,
2
the First Amendment nonetheless requires non-intervention.

With this modified analysis, it would be more difficult for the religious organization to successfully invoke the ministerial exception;

rightfully so, however, because the First Amendment is not logically implicated where a religious organization has no doctrinal

reason that it should be excluded from neutral, generally applicable
laws. Rather the court need only apply secular standards to secular
3
conduct: an analysis giving rise to no First Amendment issues.2

This model finds support in both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The model comports with the Supreme Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence, because it accounts for
whether the integrity of a church's religious belief is actually at is-

sue. Without a religious belief that impacts application of the statute, the religious institution's interest in exclusion from the statute
is low given that there is no religious belief or practice to accommodate.274 Considering the state's important interest in eradicating

271. By construing the definition of a religious reason broadly, the religious institution would
not be limited to official doctrinal proclamations or even to direct advocation of the challenged
conduct. For example, if the plaintiff alleged hostile environment sexual harassment, the church
could assert that the offending minister was not removed from his position because of the
church's belief in forgiveness and redemption rather than immediate termination. This broad
construction resolves the problem of the "gap" between officially promulgated church doctrine
and local congregational beliefs. Laycock, supra note 215, at 1390-91. Although such a broad
definition of an implicated religious doctrine or policy could encourage churches to try to fabricate a religious motivation for its conduct where none actually existed, such creative theology
would not likely be employed when a minister's conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to discourage church association with the conduct. When a church is unvilling to support or otherwise
take responsibility for a minister's conduct, the vindication of the plaintiffs statutory rights
would be of greater importance than preserving the integrity of church's employment relationship with the offending minister.
272. See supraPart II.B.1 for an overview of the Supreme Court's Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Applying Free Exercise and Establishment Clause analyses, in
addition to evaluating whether the ministerial exception should apply, comports with the Bollard court's continued First Amendment analysis after rejecting per se application of the ministerial exception. Bollard v. CaL Province of the Soe'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947-50 (9th Cir.
1999), reh'gdenied, 211 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir. 2000).
273. See supranote 6.
274. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 286 (5th
Cir. Unit A July 1981) ("Since the Seminary does not hold any religious tenet that requires discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, or national origin, the application of Title VII report-
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employment discrimination, the balance of church and state interests clearly weighs in favor of applying the statute where a religious institution advances no affected religious belief.275 Courts have
already rejected Free Exercise defenses asserted by religious organizations outside of the context of Title VII claims when these
defendants were unable to articulate a religious issue implicated by
adjudication.2 76 Courts should not treat Title VII cases any differently.
Even if the ministerial exception survived the Supreme
Court's elimination of a compelling interest test for claims to exemption from neutral laws of general applicability in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, the
Court's holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require exemption from a neutral law of general applicability indicates that
the situations under which religious accommodation is necessary
are severely circumscribed.27 7 After Smith, religious exemption is
more frequently a matter of permissive accommodation rather than
a Free Exercise right.278 Now, in evaluating church requests for accommodation from neutral laws of general applicability, courts appear to focus on whether the law burdens a core religious belief or
practice that would likely have been protected under pre-Smith jurisprudence.2 79 By requiring the existence of an impacted religious
ing requirements to it does not directly burden the exercise of any sincerely held religious be.
lief.").
275. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948 ('here the church provides no doctrinal nor protected.choico
based rationale for its alleged actions and indeed expressly disapproves of the alleged actions, a
balancing of interests strongly favors application of the statute.").
276. See, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 431 (2d
Cir. 1999) (rejecting the church defendants Free Exercise defense in the context of a breach of
fiduciary duties claim against a church for the priests alleged sexual abuse of a child where
"[t]he Diocese points to no disputed religious issue which the jury of the district judge in this case
was asked to resolve").
277. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a brief explanation of how the Supreme Coures decision in Smith changed the Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence, see supraPart II.B.1.
278. The Smith Court noted that although courts were not requiredto exempt religious institutions from neutral laws of general applicability, legislatures or courts could exempt religious
institutions from burdens on their exercise of religion, provided that such accommodation did not
result in an impermissible establishment of religion. Part II.B.1 of this Note describes in more
detail how Smith transformed claims that were formerly required under the Free Exercise
Clause into arguments for permissive accommodation of religious exercise.
279. CompareCorp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter.Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987) (holding that the amended statutory exemption of religious
institutions from liability for religious discrimination under Title VII was not only permissible
under the Establishment Clause, but also appropriate given the religious discrimination proscription's significant interference with churches' ability to carry out their religious missions by
selecting leaders based on religious criteria), with Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15
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belief or practice for application of the ministerial exception, this
model would help bring the exception in line with contemporary
Free Exercise jurisprudence.
When this model is considered in conjunction with the Su-

preme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is clear that
it not only passes muster, but it also decreases the likelihood of a

substantive Establishment Clause issue in Title VII claims against
religious organizations. Clearly, Title VII has a secular purpose and
has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion
when applied to religious and non-religious employers alike.2 0 Considering case law evaluating the constitutionality of the ministerial
exception, the excessive entanglement provision is generally the
only contentious element in the application of the Lemon test.28 1
Courts making entanglement determinations have focused on two

factors: first, whether a protracted relationship between church and
state would inevitably result from adjudication,

and second,

whether the court must evaluate religious doctrine in adjudicating
the claim.2 2 Because

courts adjudicate

numerous

potentially

lengthy civil claims involving the church without implicating First
Amendment concerns, the procedural entanglement argument that

involving a religious organization in a protracted employment discrimination case constitutes an Establishment Clause violation is

(1989) (holding that Texas' exemption of religious publications from the state sales tax was not a
permissible accommodation of religion because "when government directs a sub3idy to exclusively religious organizations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and... cannot
reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion," it conveys "a message of endorsement" in violation of the Establishment Clause (emphasis
added)).
280. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (holding that an Establishment Clause
violation may exist if a statute fails to satisfy the following criteria: (1) the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose, (2) its primary effect should neither advance nor inhibit religion, and
(3) the statute must not foster an excessive entanglement of church and state).
281. This Note evaluates the Establishment Clause issues raised by the author's proposed
ministerial exception analysis by applying Lemon because, despite the fact that the Supreme
Court has recently declined to commit to any one particular Establishment Clause test, the Establishment issues raised by the ministerial exception are most closely associated with the antientanglement prong of Lemon. See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Socey of Jesus, 196 F.3d
940, 948-50 (9th Cir. 1999) (evaluating the Establishment Clause issue raised by adjudication of
Bollard's claim under the anti-entanglement prong of Lemon), reh'g denied, 211 F.3d 1331 (9th
Cir. 2000). See supra Part II.B.1 for further discussion of the Supreme Court's contemporary
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
282. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (asserting
that courts "have found an unconstitutional entanglement with religion in situations where a
'protracted legal process pit[s] church and state as adversaries,' and where the Government is
placed in a position of choosing among 'competing religious visions' ).
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not especially strong. 288 The second factor in an entanglement
analysis, whether a question of religious doctrine or practice would
be implicated, is specifically addressed by the model this Note proposes. 284 Once the church defendant asserts a religious doctrine or
belief that would be implicated in resolving the dispute, the ministerial exception would exempt the church's conduct from Title VII.
If the religious organization cannot satisfy this burden, the court is
not placed in the position of choosing among "competing religious

visions," and no Establishment Clause violation results.

26

Courts

have already applied this argument to sexual harassment cases to
conclude that applying Title VII yields no Establishment Clause
violation because "core religious beliefs are not at issue." 286 This
same principle should be applied to all employment discrimination
claims in which religious organizations cannot articulate a religious
28 7
belief or practice that would be implicated by adjudication.

Indeed, by requiring church defendants to come forth with a
religious belief underlying their conduct, this model precludes the

strong possibility of another Establishment Clause problem: favoring religious institutions over non-religious institutions involved in
similar secular conduct.28 8 By allowing religious institutions to violate Title VII without a doctrinal reason, courts elevate religious
conduct over comparable non-religious conduct.2 89 Applying the
ministerial exception without requiring church conduct to be based

283. See, e.g., Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395, 397 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) ("[Cllaims against
religious organizations have long been recognized for premises liability, breach of a fiduciary
duty, and negligent use of motor vehicles." (citing Esbeck, supranote 6, at 76)).
284. Without ongoing interference with a religious organization's religious practices, no Establishment Clause issue arises. EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d
277, 286 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981). Therefore, requiring religious organizations to articulate
an affected religious practice comports with Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id.
285. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 465 (holding that Establishment Clause violations depend on
whether a court must choose between "competing religious visions").
286. Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F.
Supp. 2d 694, 717 (E.D.N.C. 1999) ('While a coures intrusion upon a church's selection of a minister may be viewed as an Establishment Clause violation when a court effectively mandates the
selection or forbids the discharge of a certain minister, the same cannot be said of the government's enforcement of its sexual harassment laws, a process in which core religious beliefs are
not at issue.").
287. See Gildow, supra note 266, at 1577 (arguing that because the ministerial exception as
currently formulated does not adequately distinguish between claims that implicate religious
doctrine and those that require an entirely secular inquiry, a "case-by-case analysis" would more
accurately delineate the constitutionally significant distinction between the two types of cases).
288. See, e.g., Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 17, at 324 (noting that "[flreeing religious
organizations from regulation provides a relative benefit for religion over nonreligion, which may
raise Establishment Clause concerns").
289. Id.
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on religious belief clearly has a primary effect of advancing religion,
contrary to Lemon.290 For these reasons, a ministerial exception
model focusing on whether religious institutions actually have a
religious motivation for challenged employment decisions fits more
appropriately with contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence
than mere application of the primary duties of the plaintiff analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the inception of the ministerial exception, its application has broadened-from colloquially defined ministers to any religious employees who perform some type of religious function
within the church. 291 Given the widespread acceptance of the "primary duties of the plaintiff' test,29 2 the ministerial exception has
the potential to expand to nearly all church employment disputes.
Clearly, this was not the intent expressed by Congress in its balance between religious freedom and anti-discrimination interests in
Title VII, 293 and is not required by the Constitution if religious doctrine is not implicated. Because religious institutions play an important role in shaping public attitudes and social mores, it is not
in the public interest to condone non-religious discrimination by
religious organizations if neither the First Amendment nor Title
VII requires religious exemption. 294 The model suggested by this
Note also furthers public policy by discouraging inconsistency from
religious institutions that claim they do not condone or support discrimination against protected classes and subsequently attempt to
hide behind the ministerial exception without contradicting their
public proclamations.
The model advocated by this Note does not ask religious institutions to conform their policies to majoritarian views as ex-

290. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also Marhall & Blomgren, supra

note 17, at 324-26.
291. See supra Part IV.B
292. See supraPart IV.A.
293. See supra Part II.C.; Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944
(9th Cir. 1999) ("Insofar as race, sex, and national origin are concerned, the text of Title VII
treats an employment dispute between a minister and his or her church like any other employment dispute."), reh'g denied, 211 F.3d 1331 (9th Cir. 2000).
294. See Whitney Ellenby, Divinity vs. Discrimination: Curtailing the Divine Reach of
Church Authority, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 369, 407 (1996) (asserting that "a compelling
reason for holding churches accountable for their discriminatory behavior is that religious institutions have enormous capacity to influence behavior and moral convictions far beyond the
church polity itself').
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pressed in federal employment discrimination laws. Rather, it
merely requires them to abide by their own moral dogma and policy
statements and to admit when their employment decisions are not
based in religious doctrine or practice and hence are undeserving of
constitutional protection. As shown by the sexual harassment cases,
blind application of the ministerial exception is not required in order to further the exception's underlying rationale or to give
churches the opportunity to voice Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause concerns. Rather, a two-step approach requiring religious
institutions to show the plaintiffs claim would directly implicate a
ministerial relationship and religious doctrine or practice will ensure the ministerial exception serves the constitutional interests it
was intended to address, without condoning employment discrimination lacking religious justification.
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